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6.  Executive Summary 
1.1. India has embarked on a substantial program of decentralization following the 73rd and 
74
th
 Amendment Acts to the Constitution, which call for establishing and significantly 
empowering Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) at district, sub-district (block), and village and 
urban local levels.  The World Bank’s India program is interested in these developments and is 
considering how it should support the GoI’s objectives in these governance reforms.  A wide 
range of support mechanisms is possible, including lending and analytical work, and focusing on 
national- or state-level activities and direct support for local governments or actions through 
specific sectors, such as the health sector.  
 
1.2. Although the legal foundation for decentralization has been established, the degree to 
which this has been implemented around the country varies.  Since health sector responsibilities 
are, constitutionally shared by both national and state governments, there is considerable 
variation among states regarding the degree of decentralization within the state to the levels of 
blocks and districts.  Compared to other states, West Bengal has formally granted relatively 
greater powers to sub-state levels, with PRIs said to wield greater influence over civil service 
officials in planning and service delivery decisions.  
 
1.3. Decentralization is seen by some to be a key instrument for improving service delivery 
across a range of sectors.  In the Health Nutrition and Population (HNP) sector, decentralization 
issues are increasingly gaining in importance.  Recent national initiatives, like the National Rural 
Health Mission and the Reproductive and Child Health (2) Program, call for significant 
engagement of state-, district-, block-, village-, and urban local-level governments in planning 
and service delivery management.  These new programs have aimed at increasing the quantum of 
health services that the government delivery system can provide in rural areas, investing more in 
infrastructure, human resource supply, and other critical inputs such as medicines, with a 
renewed emphasis on deconcentration of spending decisions. Notable measures included 
constitution of facility-level stakeholder committees (Rogi Kalyan Samitis), formulation of 
health plans across all administrative units (village, blocks and districts), provision of untied 
funds/maintenance grants to all tiers of health facilities and Village Health and Sanitation 
Committees, released directly and spent by the facilities and VHSCs, and forming health and 
family welfare societies at the block and district-levels to oversee all aspects of health programs 
planning and implementation. 
 
1.4. This study was designed to assess the current status of actual decentralization within the 
state of West Bengal as a basis for discussions with state officials on feasible health sector 
interventions which the Bank could support in future to impact decentralization as well as health 
systems performance.  It was also designed to assist the Bank in a more general understanding of 
the process of decentralization in India as a complement to earlier studies of decentralization 
conducted in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Orissa.  As with those previous studies, this study is 
based on surveys of officials at the district level and below to assess relationships between the 
range of decisions that local health authorities were able to make (which this report refers to as 
“decision space”), their levels of institutional capacities (such as skills, staffing and experience), 
and their accountability to local elected officials.  These three elements are currently of 
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considerable concern in the development and implementation of decentralization processes 
around the world.  
 
1.5. The study examines the concept of decision space in a special manner.  Decision space is 
the range of choices that respondents report actually making within the range of choices that they 
are officially — by law or regulation — allowed to make.  Prior studies showed that there were 
significantly different choices made by officials even if they were granted the same formal (or de 
jure) range of choices.  This is important, because a review of formal decision space reveals 
relatively limited decision space for some key health system functions that officials at the block 
and district levels have.  For instance, local officials have very little choice over hiring, firing, 
transfers, and incentives for permanent human resource staff, while they have greater control 
over contract workers as well as strategic and operational planning and some aspects of 
budgeting.  What we examined was how decentralization was affecting the ability of local 
officials to make their own decisions within the formal decision space.  
 
1.6. The study focused on five functional areas of decisions about health systems — strategic 
and operational planning, budgeting, human resources, service organization/delivery, and 
monitoring and evaluation.  Prior studies in other countries and Indian states had found that 
decentralization of decisions, capacities and accountability varied considerably among these 
functional areas.  In West Bengal, the formal decision space allowed for a significant range of 
choice over planning, service organization, monitoring and evaluation and less range over 
budgeting and human resources.  The survey questionnaire asked specific questions about what 
choices the respondents had actually made within the possible choices granted by the formal 
range of choices. 
 
1.7. The study involved a survey of health administrators, health workers and local elected 
officials in six purposefully selected districts1 to represent different socio-economic statuses, 
geographic areas and political party affiliations.  Specific surveys were designed for different 
types of officials, workers and Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs functionaries).  The report is 
based on the responses of 209 officials (48 health workers, 68 health administrators, and 93 PRI 
functionaries/office-bearers in the categories displayed in Table 1). 
 
                                                 
1
 The six districts are the following: Jalpaiguri, Uttar Dinajpur, Barddhaman, Bankura, Birbhum and Purba 
Medinipur.  
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Table 1. District-, block- and village-level health sector decision-makers in West Bengal 
Sector/role Districts Blocks Village Urban Local Bodies 
Health 
sector 
 Chief/Assistant 
Chief/Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer for 
Health 
 Project Management 
Unit members 
 Hospital 
superintendent 
 Block Medical Officer 
for Health 
 Medical Officer for 
Health 
 Block Public Health 
Nurse 
 Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife 
 Health 
Supervisor/Assistant 
 
 Medical Officer 
 Hospital 
superintendent 
PRI 
 
 Zilla Parishad 
Chairman 
(Sabhadhipati) 
 Health & Environment 
Sub-Committee 
Chairman 
 Panchayat Samiti 
Chairman (Sabhapati) 
 Health & Sanitation 
Committee member 
 Health & Family 
Welfare/Rogi Kalyan 
Samiti member 
 Gram Panchayat 
Chairman/Vice-
Chairman 
(Pradhan/Upa 
Pradhan) 
 Gram Panchayat 
member 
 
 Municipality  
Chairman  
 Swasthya Upa Samiti 
member 
 
1.8. The survey asked specific questions designed to identify health officials who had 
exercised greater or lesser degrees of choice within their officially sanctioned “decision space”, 
assess skills, experience and education of both health sector and local elected respondents (or 
their staff) — as well as the degree to which locally elected PRI officials are involved and/or 
considered in decisions about the local health system.  Use of semi-structured surveys to probe 
into these issues allowed statistical analyses to quantitatively assess relationships among the 
dimensions of decision space, capacities and accountability.  While it was originally hoped that 
these relationships could also assess which relationships might improve health sector 
performance, the poor quality of data on block and district level performance prevented any 
significant assessment of the effectiveness of these different elements of decentralization.  
 
1.9. The survey found the following: 
 
1.9.1. There was high variation in the degree of local decision making, institutional 
capacities and accountability among the six districts studied. As in the studies in UP and 
Orissa, the West Bengal study found significant variations among the six districts within each 
dimension of decentralization of decision space, capacities and/or accountability.  For instance, 
the following table shows the variations for decision space and capacities: 
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Decision Space* Capacities* 
 
 
 
 
 
* SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization; M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
1.9.2. Respondents with greater use of decision space were also those with greater 
institutional capacities and greater responsiveness to local elected officials).  Significant 
relationships among the three dimensions suggest a strong synergy.  In those districts in which 
officials reported making more decisions on their own (i.e. taking a greater range of decision 
space), were also those with higher levels of institutional capacities and more responsiveness to 
local elected officials. The results clearly show that there is a strong relationship among the three 
dimensions for nearly all functions. 
 
Table 2.  Associations across dimensions of decentralization (summary scores of all respondents) 
Function
†
 
 DS/CAP
††
  DS/ACC
††
  CAP/ACC 
 ρ  N  Ρ  N  ρ  N 
SOP  0.41 ** 112  0.11  52  0.14  135 
BUD  0.16 * 112  0.30 ** 98  0.06  143 
HR  0.16  74  0.18  55  0.11  52 
SOD  0.12  112  0.17 * 112  0.21 ** 195 
ALL  0.34 ** 112  0.26 ** 112  0.35 ** 195 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
† 
SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization 
††
 DS only applicable to health officials 
 
1.9.3. For each dimension of decentralization the different functions tended to be closely 
associated.  In other words, officials reporting high levels of decision space for strategic and 
operational planning also tended to report high use of their formal decision space for budgeting, 
human resources, and service organization.  And officials with high levels of capacity or 
accountability in one function also reported high levels in the other functions as shown in Table 
3.  
 
Table 3. Associations within dimensions of decentralization 
1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function 
DS
††
  CAP
¶
  ACC
¶¶
 
ρ  N  Ρ  N  ρ  N 
SOP & BUD 0.22 ** 112  0.13 * 195  0.13  97 
 x 
 
1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function 
DS
††
  CAP
¶
  ACC
¶¶
 
ρ  N  Ρ  N  ρ  N 
HR 0.28 ** 87  -0.01  92  0.17 * 127 
SOD 0.50 ** 112  0.17 ** 195  0.04  135 
M&E     0.33 ** 65     
LS     0.30 ** 72  0.10  52 
BUD & 
HR 0.32 ** 87  -0.14  92  0.17 * 100 
SOD 0.19 ** 112  0.04  195  0.09  143 
M&E     0.34 ** 65     
LS     0.22 * 72  0.04  98 
HR & 
SOD 0.21 * 87  0.09  92  0.16 * 138 
M&E     0.10  52     
LS         0.25 * 55 
SOD & 
M&E     0.22 * 65     
LS     0.18  72  0.16 * 112 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
† 
SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization; M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation; LS = Local Support; PRI = PRI decision-
making 
††
 DS only applicable to health officials 
¶
  LS in CAP only applicable to PRI officials  
¶¶
 LS in ACC only applicable to health officials  
 
1.9.4. Although survey respondents reported making their own decisions on planning and 
budgeting, there is reason to believe that these decisions were not necessarily responsive to 
local needs.  According to interviewer reports and observations made by the research team 
health sector planning is often viewed as a routine, tokenistic exercise that may not adequately be 
meeting basic objectives.  Many health sector respondents, for instance, characterized the 
identification of vulnerable pockets — an important aspect of local need assessment — as being 
conducted in a “pre-determined” fashion involving largely copying content from earlier plans 
into current District Health Action Plans.  Preparing budgets and financial planning was also 
found to be commonly viewed as a purely administrative requirement consisting of simple 
projections from the previous year’s sanctioned budget and with allocations made 
mechanically/without systematic review. Inadequacies in financial planning within local 
planning instruments currently promoted under NRHM can be inferred from the finding that 
hardly any respondents — even high-level officials such as CMOHs — were able to provide 
accurate verbal estimates of the extent of allocation/utilization of funds received (those provided 
were often found to be inconsistent when cross-checked with budgets/ District Health Action 
Plans). 
 
1.9.5. Health administrators who make more decisions on their own tend to have greater 
institutional capacities, but not necessarily greater responsiveness to local PRI officials.  
Analysis of the health administrators found that the synergies among the different functions were 
stronger between decision space and capacities and weaker for responsiveness toward PRI 
officials (see also Table 2 above).  This suggests that capacities have some influence on the 
confidence that health officials express in making their own decisions.  However, those PRI 
officials with greater capacities tend to be more effective in influencing their health 
administrators. In addition, the degree of local support provided by PRI officials to the health 
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sector — such as in supporting new health sector activities or actively participating in health 
sector-related development schemes — is linked to the degree of accountability demanded by 
those same PRI officials. This finding suggests the fundamental importance of capacities for 
local decision making and for accountability, and enhances arguments for capacity building for 
both heath administrators and local elected officials and for encouraging greater support from 
PRI for health activities.  
 
1.9.6. The study highlights the lack of significant role of local officials in human resources 
management in any area but contracting lower level staff. The human resources findings 
suggest that the relatively small decision space for human resources may limit the synergies and 
consistency of findings in this function. In West Bengal as elsewhere in India, district managers 
have little say over HR hiring, postings, transfers, etc, particularly in the case of doctors and 
nurses, unless they are contracted workers such as village health workers (ASHAs).  
 
1.9.7. For health administrators, capacities in monitoring and evaluation are consistently 
associated with the other functions suggesting the importance of capacity building in this 
area.  One of the more consistent findings is that among health administrators the monitoring 
and evaluation capacity is significantly associated with strategic and operational planning, 
service delivery, and budgetary capacities. 
 
1.9.8. Greater decision space for service delivery decisions by health administrators is 
consistently related to other functions (planning and human resources), suggesting an 
important argument for expanding decision space in service delivery. 
 
1.9.9. Personal experience was important for PRI officials and health workers for all three 
dimensions of decentralization; however, personal experience for health administrators 
was not significantly related to the three dimensions of decentralization. We found that the 
personal experience of PRI officials and health workers was related to the three dimensions of 
decentralization. However, health administrators with more personal experience did not report 
having greater decision space, institutional capacity or accountability. This result suggests that it 
takes time for PRI officials and health workers to learn to make use of their formal decision 
space, and that a lot of this learning is from practical experience. In some of the PRIs where there 
had been a recent change in political leadership and several first-time elects, PRI representatives 
seemed to be completely unaware of the role they could play in planning, management and 
monitoring health services. In other words, the real constraining factor was not lack of autonomy 
in the formal rules, but local inability to take advantage of these rules and fully exercise decision 
space because of lack of capacity.  
 
Table 4.  Respondent experience and dimensions of decentralization 
Respondent 
Category 
DS  CAP  ACC 
ρ N  ρ N  ρ N 
Health 
Administrators 
0.08 65  -0.02 65  -0.19 65 
Health Workers 0.29 ** 48  0.27 * 48  0.14 48 
PRI N/A   0.27 ** 93  0.03 93 
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1.9.10. Greater contact between health administrators, workers and PRI officials may be 
important in overcoming barriers to accountability and local support for health activities.  
While the research team found a considerable lack of mutual trust or desire by health and PRI 
officials to work jointly on health sector matters, it was observed that PRI involvement at the 
block level was better than at the district level.  One reason may be that Block Development 
Officers are in closer contact with PRI officials (both physically located within the Panchayat 
Samiti and interacting daily to a greater degree with PS officials than at the district level).  At the 
village and urban local unit levels also, among both health workers and PRI officials sampled in 
this study, measures of personal experience were positively associated with those individual’s 
decision space and/or capacities; for higher-level health administrators, no such connections 
were observed.  These workers and officials have more constant contact through regular 
meetings and through outreach in the community. The local health workers tended to more 
highly rate interactions with PRI officials such as calling relations “generally cooperative” or 
that PRI officials “helps as and when necessary”, than higher-level health sector administrators.     
 
1.9.11. Rules, regulations and bureaucratic red tape seem to restrict the ability and interest 
of PRI officials to get involved in the decision making process at local levels. Although PRI 
members in general were felt by the research team to be motivated, enthusiastic, energetic, and 
aware of local health problems and vulnerabilities, the current maze of rules, regulations, and 
bureaucratic red-tape (which the decentralization process has not been able to simplify) continue 
to thwart greater involvement.  The process of submission of utilization certificates, for instance, 
appears to be excessively complicated, often leading to delays in release of funds such as those 
related to JSY activities.  Additionally, instances of deliberate delay and non-cooperation by 
other line departments (notably the Public Works Departments) under the guise of “technical” 
interventions, may add to the problem.   
 
1.10. These findings suggest that, in the context of West Bengal, the pre-conditions that many 
feel are necessary for decentralization to be an appropriate policy lever for improving health 
services are present.  Administrators and workers in the health sector who take greater 
responsibilities, more actively tailor choices to local conditions, or whose decisions are not 
subject to as much revision from above, for example, also do so in the context of local health 
systems characterized by greater institutional capacities (e.g., better processes, adequate stock of 
resources) and with a higher degree of accountability towards PRIs for those decisions.  
Similarly, PRI officials who more actively demand accountability for health official decisions 
appear to have greater capacity to do so.  Further, each dimension of decentralization appears to 
build on itself.  Those who are more active decision-makers in one function, for instance, tend to 
be more active in another; the same is applicable in terms of capacities and accountability. 
 
1.11. However, there are several significant restrictions on effective local decision making.  
First, the formal range of choice over some areas is very limited — especially in the human 
resources function where there is little formal choice but also in planning and budgeting where 
reported choice is limited by formulaic processes and regulations. In addition unnecessarily 
complicated regulations have limited the incentives and ability for PRI officials to participate 
meaningfully in the process of accountability.  
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1.12. Recommendations. This study was unable to relate any of the characteristics of 
decentralization to the performance of the health system.  Indeed the literature on 
decentralization has very few studies that have been able to convincingly show that 
decentralization changes have improved or made worse health system performance.  In addition 
this study is a cross sectional study so the relationships shown cannot attribute causality to any of 
the findings.  Therefore the recommendations that are made are tentative and based on logical 
implications of the findings along with the authors’ judgments from observing and studying 
several other experiences with health system decentralization. 
 
1.12.1. Capacity building, especially in weaker districts, among both health administrators, 
health workers, and PRI officials is likely to have spill-over effects in improving decision 
making and accountability in the local health sector.  The study’s principal finding is that 
there are synergies among these three dimensions of decentralization.  While it might be useful 
to recommend that all three dimensions be strengthened, it is likely that starting with capacities is 
an effective means of influencing the other dimensions. Capacity building should first focus on 
the weaker districts so that they may work toward improving all three dimensions.  The weakest 
district identified by this survey was Uttar Dinajpur. Within the districts targeted orientation is 
strongly warranted among the first-time elects and representatives from reserved categories, and 
among freshly appointed frontline health workers. 
 
1.12.2. There are two key functional areas where capacity building for health 
administrators should be focused.  The study findings of the importance of the role of 
capacities in service delivery and monitoring and evaluation in relation to other functions 
suggests that more training and/or recruitment of experienced staff in these areas should be a 
major initiative in capacity building at the district, block, village and urban local units. 
 
1.12.3. Capacity building for PRI officials and health workers should focus on enhancing 
their knowledge of their roles in supporting local health initiatives and advocacy for local 
priorities.  Frontline health workers and PRI officials at lower levels of the system have more 
contact and experience working together; therefore, they could be involved in joint advocacy and 
support activities, as well as in monitoring and evaluation initiatives, which have been shown to 
be particularly important at the Gram Panchayat level. Experience with community involvement 
in monitoring and evaluation in other settings (in India and internationally) has been shown to 
have positive impacts on performance. This effort would strengthen the accountability 
component of decentralization.  
 
1.12.4. There is room for enhancing the local decision space especially if more uniform 
capacities can be achieved.  The functional area with the least formal decision space is human 
resources.  The partial evidence that decisions made over contract personnel at the lowest level 
are consistent with accountability  suggest that expanding the local choice over more areas of 
human resources could be a means of improving local level decision making in other areas.  
 
1.12.5. Rules and regulations for decisions involving greater accountability to local elected 
officials should be streamlined to reduce time and complexity and enhance local 
participation.  Rules and regulations needs to be streamlined and simplified, particularly those 
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related to disbursal of funds and human resources policies that encourage local decision-making 
in short time.  
 
1.12.6. Mentoring and Information Exchange among districts. Dissemination of effective 
processes and programs among peers has been shown to be an effective means of changing 
decentralized unit behavior. Promoting exchange of information between those districts where 
health and/or PRI officials have higher levels on all dimensions of decentralization with those 
with lower levels may be a productive means to demonstrate to districts what can be done to 
make more effective use of authorities under decentralization as well as suggest ways to do it. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Study motivation and research questions 
For over a quarter of a century, decentralization policies have been implemented on a large scale 
throughout the developing world.  While motivations for, and forms of, decentralization are 
diverse, those concerned with development often focus on its promise of improving governance 
arrangements and delivery of services.  As a reform measure that is consistent with theories of 
fiscal federalism, public choice, and “New Public Management”, it is hoped that decentralization 
can encourage both greater efficiencies in service delivery (in, for example, reducing 
bureaucratic red tape or making better use of information available only at the local level) and 
quality of choices made (e.g., encouraging innovation; permitting better targeting 
of/responsiveness to local priorities and preferences) (Tiebout 1956; Oates 2005; Peckham, 
Exworthy et al. 2005).  Additionally, forms of decentralization that promote greater citizen 
participation — such as political “devolution” of authorities to locally elected bodies – is 
expected to make administrative sector structures more accountable to local preferences (Mills 
and World Health Organization 1990; Tendler 1997; Manor 2003; Shah 2004; Shah and World 
Bank 2006; Yilmaz and Serrano-Berthet 2008).   
 
Decentralization-oriented policies have resonated with particularly force in the health sector.  
Decentralization of decision-making authority to local levels of the system is consistent with a 
long-standing emphasis on grassroots investment in primary care and outreach services that 
began with the Alma Ata Conference on Primary Health Care in 1978, was reinforced in the 
World Bank’s 1993 World Development Report, and has been most recently re-emphasized in 
the 2009 World Health Report (World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund 
1978; World Bank 1993; Saltman, Bankauskaite et al. 2007).  Organizational decentralization is 
also in line with the concept of health sector “stewardship” which shift emphasis from direct 
service delivery (i.e., “rower” or government-by-control) to overseer of health system 
governance arrangements (i.e., “enabler”/“steerer” or government-by-contract) (World Health 
Organization 2000).  The principles of New Public Management further support the idea of local 
governance providing better service if new management techniques are used at local levels 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
 
As reforms of decentralization have become increasingly common, however, it has become 
evident that greater local-level authority, by itself, may not result in improved local-level service 
delivery.  On the one hand, there is a difference and, at times, a disconnect between formal 
delegation of powers and actual exercise of those powers at the local level — which this study 
hereafter will term “decision space”.  In some contexts, decentralization occurs only “on paper”, 
wherein decision powers effectively remain highly centralized.  On the other hand, an enlarged 
field of action within which to make choices may not translate into a more effective exercise of 
powers if local-level oversight capacities are lacking, or local decision-makers are not held 
accountable for their choices to address local health needs.  If local-level capacities are lacking, 
for example, health sector decision-makers may eschew innovation in favor of continuing to 
operate as if bound by central rules and norms, or they may make choices in ways that are ill-
informed and/or -executed.  If mechanisms of accountability to local health priorities are absent, 
the service delivery benefits from the choices that are made may be captured by only a few and 
not improve delivery performance on a wider scale.  In short, for decentralization to be a means 
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of improving service delivery, the “necessary ingredients” include not only an appropriate degree 
of local decision-making power, but commensurate institutional capacities to enable decision-
making, and adequate mechanisms of accountability to ensure that choices made are oriented to 
bettering services.  Optimal linkages between “ingredients” of decentralization and health sector 
performance are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Synergies between decentralization and service delivery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors 
 
The goal of this study is to examine the ways in which decentralized decision-making in West 
Bengal’s health sector is consistent with the framework presented in Figure 1, above.  To do so, 
it addresses the following research question focused on relationships between the three 
dimensions of decentralization illustrated as anchor points in Figure 1: Are the “necessary 
ingredients” of decentralization in place in West Bengal, creating enabling conditions under 
which decentralized service delivery may be expected to improve services?  That is, do the 
degree of decision space, strength of institutional capacities and strength of mechanisms of 
accountability work together synergistically?   
 
This study does not focus on relationships between these three dimensions of decentralization 
and a primary goal of decentralization: improved service delivery.  Although effects of 
decentralization on service delivery are of ultimate interest to policymakers, data limitations 
precluded meaningful analyses of relationships between dimensions of decentralization and 
indicators of health systems performance (see Section 2.7 for further discussion of this study 
limitation). 
1.2 Conceptual frameworks 
This study adapts a “decision space” approach for analyzing health sector decision-making in a 
context of decentralized service delivery (Bossert 1998).  Though responsibilities for health 
sector decision-making have been officially at least partially “devolved” to PRIs across India 
(see section 1.3), it is well-known that decision-making processes vary widely both across and 
within states.  Understanding how these processes vary is therefore crucial to gaining a coherent 
picture of what health sector devolution means in practice.  The decision space approach 
represents a unified methodology to assessing three important dimensions of decision-making 
processes — the decision space of officials to make choices, the institutional capacities present 
to effectively make choices, and the mechanisms of accountability in place to shape choices.  
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The following section first discusses each dimension, in turn, then presents an overview of the 
study approach and methodology. 
1.2.1 Decision space 
Decentralization involves both formal redefinitions of relationships of authority and informal 
practices that may affect formal changes; both the formal and informal sides combine to define 
the effective “decision space” of local officials.  In any country undergoing decentralization, new 
laws, regulations, and governmental decisions are generally drafted to redefine lines of authority 
and hierarchical relationships.  The formal regulatory mechanisms govern the degree to which 
increased powers or ranges of choice are accorded over different functions.  Fiscal 
decentralization of revenue and/or expenditure assignments, for example, may or may not occur 
alongside decentralization of administrative functions such as human resources management 
practices or the organization of services delivered.  Analogously, greater local-level authority by 
health officials over administrative functions (e.g., recruitment and hiring of nurses) may not be 
matched with greater authority over fiscal decisions needed to exercise those powers (e.g., 
deciding on the number of and budgeting for funded posts).  Table 1 provides an overview of 
common health sector functions that may be affected by decentralization (particular sub-
functions that are addressed by this study are underlined). 
 
Table 1. Health sector decentralization — functions commonly affected and determinants of choice 
Function Sub-functions Key determinants 
 Planning  Design of area plans  Degree of local input required/provided 
 Budgeting and 
management of finances 
 Regular budgeting  Ability to allocate resources according to locally 
determined priorities 
 Collection/use of user fees for 
financing 
 Ability to set/modify/allocate user fee finances 
 Collection/use of other local 
revenues for financing 
 Ability to use locally-generated resources (apart 
from user fees) for financing 
 Administration of 
human resources 
 Hiring/firing 
 Posting/Transferring 
 Promoting/demoting 
 Contracting 
 Ability to hire/fire staff at different levels 
(doctors, nurses, non-medical staff, etc.) 
 Ability to post/transfer staff 
 Ability to promote/demote staff 
 Ability to contract non-salaried personnel for 
services  
 Salary range  Ability to modify salaried workers’ salary scale 
 Provider payment mechanisms  Ability to implement alternative forms of 
provider payment 
 Services organization 
and delivery 
 Central schemes  Ability to choose over/modify implementation of 
nationally determined standards and programs 
 Facility rules  Ability to set facility rules at local level 
 Procurement  Authority levels granted/exercised over 
procurement 
 Hospital autonomy/governance  Degree of independence in hospital management 
  
 Monitoring and 
evaluation 
 Use of HMIS  Requirements for HMIS reporting 
 Ability to use HMIS information for local 
decision making 
 Performance management  Requirements for performance management 
Source: authors 
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Beyond what is written in official documents, the actual exercise of authorities may vary among 
localities for a variety of reasons.  On the one hand, higher-level authorities may attempt to 
maintain a tight grip over local-level decisions by introducing red tape related to officially 
“local” decisions.  Central authorities can also use fiscal decision space to affect administrative 
decision space.  Greater ability to organize or contract for services according to local conditions, 
for instance, may mean little if the preponderance of financing is channeled through central 
programs with strict rules and regulations and/or local own-source revenues are minimal.  
Conversely, higher-level authorities may choose to largely abide by decisions made by lower-
level officials; in the extreme, lack of enforcement of formal relationships may lead to “bending 
the rules”.  On the other hand, local-level authorities may be more or less inclined to take full 
advantage of powers officially accorded to them.  Particularly pro-active local officials, for 
example, may use authorities to innovate in order to adapt service delivery to local conditions.  
Others may continue to rely on the center for direction, resulting in practices that largely emulate 
pre-decentralized relationships of authority.  In short, local officials may be de facto more or less 
permitted or inclined to exercise powers that they enjoy de jure.  Addressing this study’s two 
basic questions about decentralization therefore involves examining the actual exercise of 
powers by various officials at local levels of the system. 
1.2.2 Institutional capacities 
Capacity may be defined as “ability of individuals, organizations or systems to perform 
appropriate functions effectively, efficiently and sustainably” (UNDP 1998).  The concept of 
“institutional capacities” has come to encompass a variety of different capabilities — 
administrative, technical, organizational, financial, human/personnel — at multiple levels of 
aggregation — system, organizational, and individual.  Broadly speaking, systems-level 
capacities focus on macro-level structures (e.g., legal rules) that shape health sector governance, 
organizational-level capacities focus on processes within institutions that affect service delivery 
(such as mechanisms for planning and monitoring), while individual-level capacities focus on 
personal skills and training (see Table 2, below).  At both the system and organizational levels, 
processes and resources are important components to institutional capacities.  Additionally, some 
capacities are relevant at multiple levels of aggregation, such as the adequacy of human/financial 
resources or the use of health information for decision-making.  As this study is focused on 
district-level (and below) decision-making in health, it also focuses primarily on institutional 
capacities at the organizational and individual levels. 
 
Table 2. Levels, dimensions and indicators of institutional capacities 
Level  Dimensions Capacity indicators 
System 
 Policy (systems have a purpose) 
 Legal/regulatory (rules, laws, norms, 
standards) 
 Management/accountability (who oversees 
and who implements) 
 Resources (human, financial, information) 
 
 Health policies/legislation established 
 Sector-wide strategy articulated 
 Formal/informal coalitions and/or 
multi-sectoral collaboration in place 
Organizations 
 Mission/strategy (e.g., role, mandate) 
 Culture (e.g., management values and 
styles) 
 Processes (e.g., .use of information for 
management; inter-relationships; planning 
and implementation, monitoring and 
 Strategic and operational plans in 
place 
 Trained/supported staff 
 Functional: management systems (e.g., 
available supplies; supervision 
undertaken); financial management 
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Level  Dimensions Capacity indicators 
evaluation) 
 Resources (human, financial, information) 
systems (e.g., available resource); 
information systems (e.g., timely 
analysis of health information for 
decision-making); service delivery 
systems 
Individuals 
 Education/training 
 Skills 
 Years of education/training 
 Skill set of staff 
Adapted from: (Boffin 2002) 
1.2.3 Accountability 
Accountability revolves around answerability and enforcement.  It can be defined as a 
relationship between parties in which one or more parties has obligations to answer/justify 
questions regarding decisions and actions, with mechanisms of enforcement in place that can 
effectively be directed towards the answerable party (e.g., sanctions) (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 
2008; Yilmaz and Serrano-Berthet 2008).  There are many ways to dissect and examine 
dimensions of accountability, including focusing on directions and objects of accountability.  As 
presented in Table 3, directions of accountability include: those between administrators within 
the state apparatus, whether “upward” accountability from lower to higher levels of the system or 
“horizontal” accountability among different branches of government at a given level of the 
system; and those between the state apparatus and citizens/citizen representatives, which can be 
termed “downward” accountability.  Objects of accountability include those oriented for process, 
such as procurement and financial management mechanisms to ensure proper use of state funds, 
and those focused on performance, such as achievement of targets for specific outcomes. 
 
In the context of locally devolved decision-making in West Bengal, this study uses the term 
“accountability” in a very specific way: it focuses on the “downward accountability” of local 
administrators, primarily in the health sector but also for general administrators, to locally-
elected Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) bodies.  As indicated in the last column of Table 3, 
other forms of accountability, such as upward accountability within the Ministry of Health or 
accountability for performance, are largely captured in the other concepts of decision space and 
capacities.  It is recognized that this study’s use of the term is limited on several fronts.  In 
particular, the study does not attempt to evaluate whether accountability to citizens’ 
representatives (i.e., PRI bodies) constitutes downward accountability to local citizens 
themselves.  Indeed, the degree to which the latter holds true depends in large part on the quality 
of “political” accountability at the local level, or the extent to which governments respond to 
electoral concerns such as in delivering on electoral promises and aggregating/representing 
citizens’ interests (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008).  Thus while this study’s use of the term 
“accountability” is conceptually clear, it comes at the price of providing only a limited analysis 
of accountability.  It is also left to the reader to decide on the extent to which downward 
accountability to citizens’ representatives in West Bengal, PRI bodies, translates into 
accountability to citizens themselves.  This issue is further complicated by the reported strength 
of one political party — Communist Party of India (Marxist) — which may restrict the decision 
space of local elected officials who are party members.  Assessing this influence was beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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Table 3. Dimensions of accountability 
Dimension  Definition Examples of mechanisms Relationship to study 
terminology 
Directions of 
accountability 
 To other actors within the 
status apparatus: “upward” 
/ “horizontal” 
accountability  
 Directives from above 
 Executive/legislative 
separation of powers 
 Decision space: degree to 
which MOHFW exerts 
control over lower-level 
processes 
 To citizens and their 
representatives: 
“downward” accountability 
 Elections of local 
governments 
 Oversight of local 
administrators by locally 
elected representatives 
 Accountability: of health 
sector/other 
administrators to PRI 
bodies 
Objects of 
accountability 
 Process: respecting rules 
and regulations 
 Financial accountability  Capacity: use of formal 
accountability 
mechanisms 
 Performance: achieving 
outcomes 
 Performance agreements to 
achieve agreed-upon health 
goals and targets 
 Capacity: adequacy of 
monitoring and evaluation 
systems 
Source: authors’ adaptation from (Yilmaz and Serrano-Berthet 2008). 
 
It should be noted that lines between different forms of accountability are often blurred, either in 
theory, in practice, or both.  In terms of direction of accountability, for instance, it is not 
uncommon for local health administrators to be employed by the government (e.g., on a 
permanent employee basis by the government of West Bengal), but also report to and/or be held 
formally accountable for certain activities by local government officials (or, conversely, be 
directly employed by local governments but receive technical oversight from higher-level 
officials).  As a result, local civil service administrators or workers involved in policymaking 
and/or service delivery are both politically accountable to local governments (e.g., in terms of 
appointment) but upwardly accountable to Ministries of Health (e.g., in terms of salary level).  
As an example, frontline Accredited Social Health Workers (ASHAs) in India are accountable to 
both village-level Gram Panchayat PRI bodies and the State Department of Health and Family 
Welfare (Hammer, Aiyar et al. 2006).  Similarly, being accountable for performance is likely to 
depend, in part, on respecting the financial or administrative rules and regulations that govern 
performance targets.  The distinctions made in Table 3 are nonetheless useful for disentangling 
different elements of accountability as well as making clear which elements of accountability are 
addressed — and which are left out — by this study. 
1.2.4 Relationships between decision space, capacities and accountability 
As related in the introductory section, many suggest that decision space, institutional capacities 
and (downward) accountability need to work in tandem for health sector decentralization to 
improve service delivery.  Equipping local authorities with greater discretion to provide or 
oversee public sector services provides local institutions the flexibility to be more responsive to 
preferences and needs of constituents.  However, without adequate institutional capacities, 
officials may not be able to respond any more effectively to local needs than under centralized 
regimes.  An insufficient stock of accounting personnel, for instance, may result in historical 
budgeting practices rather than the preferred strategic planning/budgeting process, or inability to 
collect/compile/analyze performance data might result in planning practices that are divorced of 
local conditions.  Similarly, adequate mechanisms of downward accountability may be important 
in orienting decisions to improving delivery of services.  As noted by Shah (2004) in reference to 
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fiscal decentralization, “institutions of accountability are the key to the success of decentralized 
decision making” (Shah 2004).  Greater control over local-level decisions and resources can be a 
motivating force for citizens to participate in, and oversee, local decision-making processes.  In 
short, the promise of decentralization for improving service delivery lies in synergies between 
decision space accorded to local authorities, institutional capacities to allow exercise of those 
authorities, and adequate mechanisms of (downward) accountability to ensure that local 
decisions are in line with local needs and priorities. 
 
By measuring decentralization along all three lines of decision space, institutional capacities and 
accountability, this study attempts to translate into empirical analysis the theoretical linkages.  
While the study methodology is more fully described in Section 2, Table 4 illustrates the essence 
of this approach.  For each dimension of decentralization, health sector functions can be related 
to decision space, capacities and accountability.  Specific processes related to each can be 
thought of as representing narrow (low), moderate or wide (high) decision space 
(capacities/accountability) within the context of health sector decision-making in West Bengal.  
In terms of budgeting, for instance, narrow decision space might reflect allocation of line items 
that by-and-large conform to central norms or standards; wide decision space could reflect 
allocations that, while overseen by central authorities, are left largely to localities to determine.  
We re-emphasize that these subjective valuations of narrow/low, moderate and wide/high are 
relative to the context of West Bengal and not to the realm of possible governance arrangements 
found in health systems outside of India (or even relative to other states of India). 
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Table 4. Unified methodology for assessing decision space, capacities and accountability 
Function / 
Illustrative Indicator 
Dimension 
Level of decision space (DS), capacity (CAP) or accountability (ACC) 
Narrow/Low Moderate Wide/High 
Planning     
 Local involvement in 
planning 
DS Local health administrator mainly defer 
to central planning norms/targets 
Local health administrators make some 
local-level adaptations to central 
planning norms/targets 
Local health administrator mainly 
include locally defined strategies and 
targets 
 CAP No training in planning for health 
administrators; no involvement of other 
sectors 
Some health administrators trained in 
planning; some involvement of other 
sectors 
All health administrators trained in 
planning; other sectors routinely 
involved 
 ACC Locally elected officials play no or 
minimal oversight role (e.g., via 
Samitis)  
Locally elected officials play some 
oversight role but also defer to civil 
service administrators 
Locally elected officials exercise active 
oversight role alongside civil service 
administrators 
Budgeting     
 Preparation of 
regular budget 
DS Budget line items conform mainly to 
central norms 
Local revisions made to budget line 
items but most allocative decisions  
made by higher authorities 
Local revisions made to budget line 
items with minimal revisions made by 
higher authorities 
 CAP Previous year’s achievements not 
reviewed to inform budgeting process 
 Previous year’s achievements reviewed 
to inform budgeting process 
 ACC Locally elected officials not involved Locally elected officials involved but 
input restricted by other local 
administrators 
Locally elected officials provide 
significant inputs to and final 
authorization of budget 
HR     
 Management of 
human resources 
DS All HRM functions handled centrally 
for permanent staff; no ability to 
contract non-permanent staff 
Some HRM functions handled locally 
for permanent staff (e.g., posting, 
promotion, incentive payment); ability 
to contract some cadres of non-
permanent staff (e.g., ancillary staff) 
Most/all functions handled locally 
(including salary levels); ability to 
contract most/all cadres of non-
permanent staff 
 CAP No/few managerial staff trained in 
HRM; no performance evaluation 
mechanisms used 
Some managerial staff trained in HRM; 
performance evaluation mechanisms 
used variably 
Most/all managerial staff trained in 
HRM; performance evaluation 
mechanisms used regularly 
 ACC Locally elected officials not actively 
involved in vested HRM powers (e.g., 
monitoring and certifying doctor 
Locally elected officials actively 
involved in some of their vested HRM 
powers 
Locally elected officials actively 
involved in most of their vested HRM 
powers 
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Function / 
Illustrative Indicator 
Dimension 
Level of decision space (DS), capacity (CAP) or accountability (ACC) 
Narrow/Low Moderate Wide/High 
facility attendance) 
Service Organization     
 DS Little local-level adaptation to services 
(e.g., no/few modifications to facility 
hours; no development of non-
mandated programs) 
Some local-level adaptation of services Significant local-level adaptation of 
services 
 CAP No mechanisms in place to ensure 
quality of services (e.g., patient 
complaint procedures; inter-sectoral 
collaboration) 
Some mechanisms in place to ensure 
quality of services but not consistently 
used 
Mechanisms in place to ensure quality 
of services and consistently used 
 ACC Locally elected officials not involved 
and/or involvement not acted upon 
(e.g., no action taken regarding service 
complaints)  
Locally elected officials somewhat 
involved and/or involvement sometimes 
acted upon 
Locally elected officials very  involved 
and/or involvement usually acted upon 
Monitoring and Evaluation   
 DS Local officials have no ability to 
influence monitorable performance 
parameters, which are set at the centre 
Some local adaptation of centrally set 
monitorable parameters 
 Significant local-level adaptation of 
monitorable parameters 
 CAP No/little local-level use of monitoring 
mechanisms (e.g., HMIS, budget 
execution, HRM); no/little performance 
feedback from above 
Some use of monitoring 
mechanisms/performance feedback from 
above 
Regular use of monitoring 
mechanisms/performance feedback from 
above 
 ACC Locally elected officials are not 
involved/given any feedback about 
performance of health programs and 
facilities in their area 
Locally elected officials are 
involved/given feedback about 
performance of health programs and 
facilities but without formal authorities 
Locally elected officials are empowered 
to monitor and demand feedback/action 
related to performance of health 
programs and facilities 
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1.3 Background to India/West Bengal Health Sector 
It has been 15 years since the passage of the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 constitutional amendments re-
invigorated the process of decentralization in India.  These amendments have given greater 
autonomy — and endowed constitutional status — to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in areas 
such as functional and fiscal power and responsibility, local planning and development and local 
electoral processes.   
 
In West Bengal, the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 gives each level of the three-tiered PRI 
system specific authorities and responsibilities in several sectors, including health care, with 
large areas of overlap or co-responsibility with state level authorities.  However until the early 
2000 these acts and constitutional amendments were not translated into concrete implementation 
arrangements to include local government in the planning, implementation and monitoring of 
health services.  
 
The major formal authority for decision making and implementation of health activities remained 
the responsibility of the state civil service. Major positions at the state and district level are 
occupied by officials who are members of the national Indian Administrative Service (IAS), who 
are trained to be administrators of the system and not specific technical experts in any of the 
many substantive functions of the government programs
1
.  In the health sector, responsibility 
over the health system administration, public health programs at the district-level, and grass-root 
medical facilities below district level, are held primarily by the Chief Medical Officer for Health 
(CMOH). The CMOH reports to the Director of Health Services (DHS) at the state DoHFW 
Secretariat.  CMOHs are supported by a variety of cadres with similar responsibilities, including 
Assistant Chief Medical Officers (ACMOHs) and Deputy Chief Medical Officers (DYCMOHs).     
 
Over the last ten years, the state of West Bengal has implemented a series of state and national 
level health policy initiatives, which have significantly changed the role of different levels of 
government in the delivery of services, increased the extent of decentralization, and brought PRI 
functionaries onto a common platform with health officials.  
 in Box 1 presents primary decision-makers currently involved in the health sector in West 
Bengal
2
. 
 
The first of these initiatives was the State Health Sector Strategy (HSS), 2004-2013. The 
GoWB’s Department of Health and Family Welfare (DoHFW) launched the Health Sector 
Strategy, 2004-13, with the following key objectives: 
 
- To improve the access of poor and unreached groups to curative, preventive, promotive 
and rehabilitative health services; 
- To reduce maternal and child mortality and the burden of communicable, non-
communicable and nutrition-related diseases and disorders; and 
- To ensure quality at all levels of health and medical care services. 
 
The HSS repeatedly emphasized the role of PRIs in health services service delivery, for example 
claiming that: “the DoHFW is determined to strengthen de-concentration and decentralization in 
health planning and management as a key development in ensuring improved targeting of 
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services to the most needy and so ensure improved equity of access (HSS, p. 3)”.  The strategy 
envisioned a new approach to delivering primary services, with enhanced community 
participation, and with the objective of bringing primary care services closer to the community.  
Decentralization is listed as one of the key “Strategic Priorities” (Strategic Priority n. 3), with the 
premise that “health of the community is safer in the community’s hands”.3  During the 
preparation of the HSS, in 2002, all centrally sponsored schemes were merged into one Society, 
the Zilla Swasthaya Samiti (ZSS), or District Health and Family Welfare Society (DHFWS), at 
the District level, which in 2005 became the executive body of the District Health Mission 
constituted under the NRHM.  Except the HIV/AIDS program which still has a separate society, 
all other programs (e.g., RCH2, Immunization, Disease Control (Leprosy, TB, Blindness)) were 
merged, although budgets remained separated.  Each Samiti has representatives from Panchayati 
Raj Institutions (local governing bodies), and the health administration as lead members (see 
below). 
 
Subsequent to the HSS, in 2005 the state launched the Health System Development Initiative, to 
be implemented over the five-year period 2005-06 to 2009-10 
4
.  The HSDI seeks to translate 
key aspects of the HSS into specific investments/programs, and policy/institutional reforms, 
which are specified in a “Matrix of Milestones.” The HSS’s Strategic Priority number 3 on 
Decentralization has been renamed “Organization and Management Systems”, and includes, 
together with decentralization, HR reforms and HMIS strengthening. Under the decentralization 
subset, the following have been the main achievements over the last 5 years: 
 
a) Formation of Rogi Kalyan Samitis (RKS) from Medical College till Block Primary Health 
Care level health facilities, with representatives from local institutions.  Each RKS would have 
representatives from the respective levels of general administration, PRI, and health 
administration as lead members. The relevant government orders (dated November 7, 2005 and 
March 1, 2006) explicitly delineated the roles and functions of a RKS which, taken together, 
painted a comprehensive management structure at the facility level.  
 
b) Increase responsibilities of the Gram Panchayats in planning and monitoring service delivery. 
All subcentres (SCs) territorial borders were reshaped to coincide with the GP borders, and in 
each GP a Headquarter SC was created to coincide with the GP Headquarter. GPs have been 
made responsible for maintaining SCs and Primary Health Centres PHCs)
5
, recruiting Accredited 
Social Health Activists (ASHAs), and bringing together various stakeholders (ANMs, 
Anganwadi workers, and ASHAS) to improve delivery of preventive services at the grass-root 
level. On the 4
th
 Saturday of each month, a meeting is scheduled at Gram Panchayat level with 
all grass-root workers to take stock of progress and bringing convergence.  
 
Finally, in 2005-6 the Indian government launched the National Rural Health Mission, 2005-
2012.  NRHM seeks to expand and reorganize the basic health care delivery system to provide 
effective healthcare to rural people throughout the country. The core NRHM strategies in West 
Bengal included: (i) introduction of an Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) in every 
village to act as a bridge between the ANM and the village community; (ii) preparation of 
Village Health Plans and District Health Plans, with allocation of flexible (‘untied’) funds to 
each facility from the lowest level Subcenters to District Hospitals; (iii) revamping and 
expanding the rural health care infrastructure; (iv) a cash benefit to women who utilize antenatal 
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care and institutional delivery facilities (Janani Suraksha Yojana), intended to overcome the 
financial disincentive to seek institutional delivery.  
 
Under NRHM, decentralization has further progressed in two directions: (1) further devolution 
of powers and resources to local institutions, and (2) deconcentration of powers and resources to 
the districts and lower levels of health administration.  The first direction was extremely 
important in the context of local oversight and solutions. Several approaches have been 
simultaneously followed to meet these objectives: (a) empowering District and block level 
Samitis (societies), and RKS at the facility level by providing them with increased institutional 
capacity
6
 and untied funds
7
; (b) Creation of Village Health and Sanitation Committees in each 
village, which have been given untied funds year to spend on locally decided priorities. 
 
NRHM radically increased the amount of funds managed by the DHFW Samiti (Society). These 
Samities now act as the principal hub of channelizing off-budget fund which account for about 
20 percent of total health spending by government.  Samitis are not only receiving more funds, 
but are also entrusted with more autonomy on how the untied funds would be spent.  In other 
words, the reform process now asks the Samitis, the face of decentralization, to change their role 
– from a mere fund-router to a resource manager. 
 
While such initiatives by the central and various state governments in India have demonstrated 
an active commitment towards decentralizing “funds, functions, and functionaries” to local 
governments and to support local planning, there is still limited evidence about the process of 
decentralization and its likely impacts.  Moreover, little is known systematically about the actual 
‘divergence’ from formal institutional arrangements aiding effective decentralization, and as we 
have raised in the research questions, how far does local stakeholders actually exercise the roles 
and functions expected of them. 
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Box 1: District-block and village-level stakeholders 
 
Table 5. District-, block- and village-level health sector decision-makers in West Bengal 
Sector/role Districts Blocks Village Urban Local 
Bodies 
IAS  District Magistrate*  Block Development 
Officer* 
  
Health 
sector 
 Chief/Assistant 
Chief/Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer for 
Health 
 Project Management 
Unit members 
 Hospital 
superintendent 
 Block Medical 
Officer for Health 
 Medical Officer for 
Health 
 Block Public Health 
Nurse 
 Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife 
 Health 
Supervisor/Assistant 
 Accredited Social 
Health Activist** 
 Aanganwadi 
worker** 
 Medical Officer 
 Hospital 
superintendent 
PRI 
 
 Zilla Parishad 
Chairman 
(Sabhadhipati) 
 Public Health & 
Environment Sub-
Committee 
Chairman 
 Panchayat Samiti 
Chairman 
(Sabhapati) 
 Public Health & 
Sanitation 
Committee member 
 Health & Family 
Welfare/Rogi 
Kalyan Samiti 
member 
 Gram Panchayat 
Chairman/Vice-
Chairman 
(Pradhan/Upa 
Pradhan) 
 Gram Panchayat 
member 
 Village Health and 
Social Committee 
member* 
 Municipality  
Chairman  
 Swasthya Upa 
Samiti member 
* Interviewed but excluded from final analysis (see Endnote 1) 
** Included in sampling frame but no interviews were able to be implemented for this cadre 
 
Responsibility over most health and medical facilities at the district-level are held primarily by Chief 
Medical Officer for Health (CMOHs).  CMOHs are involved in general planning, supervision, and 
coordinating implementation of all programs.  The CMOH: is the member-secretary of the District 
Health & Family Welfare Samiti (DHFWS); a special invitee in the meetings of the Janaswathya-O-
Paribesh Sthayee Samiti (Standing Committee on Public Health & Environment, responsible for 
deciding on public health and sanitation initiatives and programs and for overseeing functioning of 
health facilities and delivery of services) of the Zilla Parishad (ZP); and advises the ZP president 
(Sabhadhipati) and the district administration on policy matters and daily activities related to health 
service delivery.  The CMOH also supervises the functioning of the NRHM District Program 
Management Unit (DPMU), and coordinates between the activities of different health programs and 
interventions.  While the ACMOH is generally in charge of similar functions at the sub-division level, 
DyCMOHs, who generally number three or four in a district, assist the CMOH in specific areas such 
as implementation of RCH services, HMIS, national disease programs (e.g., TB, leprosy and 
blindness) and personnel and general administration. 
 
The ZP Chairman (Sabhadhipati) chairs the ZP Standing Committee on Public Health & Environment, 
the DHFWS, and the district-level hospital’s Rogi Kalyan Samiti (RKS).  On paper, the ZP Chairman, 
together with civil service (DM, BDOs) and health (CMOH/BMOH), also participates in consultative 
processes of local need assessment, identifying local vulnerabilities and deciding on health service 
delivery improvement measures.  As a member of the RKS, the ZP Chairman also provides opinions 
and decides on the priority expenditure under available funds and routine activities/functioning of the 
district-level hospital. 
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2. 
  At the block level, Medical Officers (MOs) are doctors at the Primary Health Center- (PHC), Block 
Primary Health Centres (BPHC), Rural Hospitals (RH), and Sub-Divisional/State General Hospitals 
(SDH/SGH). MOs are usually fresh MBBS appointees in PHCs, and on seniority-basis are promoted 
to upper-level health facilities. In SDH/SGH hospitals, as well as District hospitals, superintendents 
are in charge of administration, primarily concerned with curative service provisions. Based on their 
place of posting, these officials participate in the activities of the RKSs, and advise/consult with and 
report to the BMOH/ACMOH/CMOH regarding general service delivery, facility-level planning and 
budget/financial expenditures specific to the health facility.  Block Public Health Nurses (BPHNs) are 
public health workers, who assist the BMOH in planning, supervision, implementation and 
feedback/reporting of national public health programs.   
 
The Panchayat Samiti (PS) serves functions largely similar to the ZP (described above) at the block 
level.  Like the ZP president, the PS Chairman (Sabhapati) chairs the PS Health and Family Welfare 
Society and the RKSs of block level hospitals, and the PS has a sub-committee of elected members 
which oversees public health functions; a major part of the functions/powers/responsibilities of these 
bodies are similar to those in the district-level ZP.  PHC MOs are expected to attend Panchayat Samiti 
meetings 
 
In urban settings, the sub-committee on public health/health cell in the ULB looks after the public 
health as well as functioning of urban health centers/health posts.  The sub-committees are headed by a 
chairman-in-council, with the local ACMOH (often) as an invited member and comprises of elected 
members to the ULB, municipal sanitary inspector and health officers/medical officers as invitees. 
Urban health centers and public health programs in the ULBs are mostly supported through separate 
funds from the municipal affairs department apart from supplementary funds from the health 
department. 
 
Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs) are the front-line health workers at the village/sub-centre  level.  
ANMs hold a minimum level of education of 10
th
 pass and receive one and one-half years of 
specialized training. Senior ANMs with at least five years of experience can receive additional training 
to supervise and provide technical assistance to ANMs.  ANMs receive some professional training at 
the time of joining and are supposed to have received specific training in planning and management of 
funds of the sub center (a responsibility they share with the Gram Pradhan). On paper, they should be 
involved in developing the Village Health Plans, oversee the activities of Village Health and Social 
Committee (VHSC) (a GP standing committee) wherever existing and provide a monthly log of 
activities and performance indicators to the BMOH. 
 
On the PRI side, Gram Panchayats (GPs) are headed by GP Pradhan and attended by other GP 
members.  All GP members are supposed to receive short term training on PRI roles and 
responsibilities.  The GP Pradhan is a member of the Block Health & Family Welfare Samiti 
(BHFWS) (with roles and responsibilities analogous to those of the DHFWS) and the RKS of the local 
Primary Health Center (PHC).  Additionally, GP members are involved in creating awareness among 
the local people about the main aspects of public health and helping in different aspects of curative and 
preventive care, including family planning and child nutrition under the Integrated Child Development 
Scheme (ICDS) and midday meal scheme, overseeing and helping in implementing the schemes of 
maternal & child health care (RCH) and disease control (TB, malaria, etc.), maintaining the birth-
death register and assist/advise/monitor daily activities and functions of ANM and other health 
workers in local health facilities. 
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2. Methodology 
The following analysis builds on the “decision space” approach that analyzes and distinguishes 
between the de jure (formal) range of choice (i.e., decision space that that officials at different 
levels of government are granted by legislation, decrees, and other government regulations) and 
the de facto range of choice that they report actually exercising in their positions (Bossert 1998).  
The formal range of choice was assessed through reviewing key legislation, previous literature 
and reliance on knowledge of expert informants who have worked in or with the Ministry of 
Health and other government offices.  The de facto range of choice was assessed primarily 
through a survey of 225 officials (48 health workers, 68 health administrators, 93 PRI 
functionaries/office-bearers and 16 civil service administrators
8
) carried out in six of West 
Bengal’s 18 districts.  This survey asked specific questions about health sector choices made by 
officials and stakeholders in five functional areas — strategic and operational planning, 
budgeting, human resources, service organization/delivery, and monitoring and evaluation.  It 
also gathered data on two additional themes — local support provided to the health sector and 
PRI decision-making processes — to complement and enrich the analyses focused on health 
functions.  The content of the questions covered decision space, institutional capacities to make 
those choices, and accountability of decision-making to locally elected officials. 
2.2 Study design 
2.3 Survey development 
The research instrument used in West Bengal is semi-structured, containing both closed- and 
open-ended questions.  Development of survey items (questions) was based on modifying similar 
questionnaire instruments developed by Harvard School of Public Health and used elsewhere in 
India (Uttar Pradesh and Orissa), as well as in other developing countries (e.g., Pakistan, 
Vietnam).  To develop the questions specific to West Bengal, Sumit Mazumdar from CSSSC met 
with Thomas Bossert, Paolo Belli to review and modify those administered previously.  Drafts 
were exchanged by e-mail to decide on the final instruments.  The instruments used for key 
officials were designed for specific enquiry about the choices they have been able to make, the 
restrictions on those choices imposed by higher authorities, the processes by which decisions are 
made, and the skills, experience, training and other capacities they have for making those 
decisions. The instruments were reviewed by experts at the Bank and officials within the 
Government of West Bengal Departments of Health and Family Welfare and Panchayats and 
Rural Development for final adjustment or inclusion of needs according to needs before 
finalization.  Each survey instrument was designed to elicit information about decisions made by 
local-level officials during the current year.   
2.3.1 Dimensions of decentralization 
The survey instruments operationalized the concepts of decision space, institutional capacities 
and accountability, as follows: 
 Decision Space (DS): Decision space relates primarily to health administrators/workers 
and other civil service officials and was reflected by assessing respondents and higher-
level authorities involvement in local decisions.  Two broad elements of decision space 
were assessed.  The first relates to the range of decisions over which respondents reported 
making choices, such as the threshold level up to which a particular MO reported 
conducting procurement.  Among this group of questions, making greater use of 
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permissible authority and/or choices that go beyond the status quo, such as a CMOH 
using contracting mechanisms to fill human resources needs, is interpreted as creating a 
wider decision space.  The second element relates to the degree to which locally-made 
decisions are affected or accepted by higher-level authorities, such as whether budgets 
prepared by CMOs were later subjected to state-level revisions.
9
   
 Capacity (CAP): As institutional capacities reflect attributes of individuals, processes 
and systems, questions of all three elements were asked of respondents.  Individual-level 
attributes in capacities relate primarily to administrative and technical capacities of local 
health sector stakeholders, such as adequacy of staff skills.  Additionally, a more active 
degree of involvement reported by respondents in activities for which they are expected 
to participate (e.g., prevalence/coverage surveys under centrally sponsored schemes for 
ANMs) is interpreted as higher capacity.  In terms of processes, capacities reflected 
practices felt to be associated with higher or lower capacities, such as use of data, 
monitoring and evaluation by health administrators to make decisions or degree of multi-
sectoral/stakeholder involvement in developing strategic plans.  System-level attributes 
reflected resource-related capacities, such as availability of funds, infrastructure or staff.   
 Accountability (ACC): As emphasized in Section 1.2.3, accountability, as 
conceptualized in this study, relates to the degree to which non-elected officials are held 
accountable by elected bodies.  Among PRI respondents, accountability was assessed by 
examining the degree to which respondents were actively involved in health sector affairs 
(e.g., whether they complained about bad performance of doctors and what happened), as 
well as the degree to which these respondents felt their views were acted upon by non-
elected decision-makers (e.g., whether PRI views were represented in final strategic 
plans).  For non-elected officials, accountability was defined as the degree to which 
respondents reported PRI involvement in health sector decision-making. 
2.3.2 Decision-making functions  
The health functions analyzed are broad and contain several sub-themes.  Strategic and 
operational planning, for example, involves processes related to setting future health programs, 
formulating/projecting budgets, and determining long-term priorities.  Table 15 of Appendix I 
presents the number of questions that appear in the research instruments for each category of 
respondent, dimension of decentralization and health function. The following provides a brief 
overview of the content of each function and sub-themes (as well as the two additional themes of 
local support and PRI decision-making previously identified): 
 Strategic and Operational Planning (SOP): This theme relates to development of 
multi-year (strategic) and annual (operational) plans at the district level (e.g., NRHM 
District Action Plan).  Questions focus on technical planning processes for future 
activities.  Examples of specific topics and/or survey questions include: the degree to 
which respondents, other stakeholders and other bodies (e.g., GPs) are involved in 
developing plans, whether planning training had occurred, whether and/or how 
respondents established local priorities; and whether monitoring/review mechanisms are 
in place/are used for planning.  
 Budgeting (BUD): This theme relates to the allocation of funds for current and future 
activities.  Questions focus on allocation of funds disbursed centrally as well as 
supplementary funds raised locally (if applicable).  Examples of specific topics and/or 
survey questions include: whether respondents are involved in budgeting processes; 
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criteria used to allocate disbursed funds to programs and activities; whether respondents 
have sufficient personnel with accounting training; and if respondents can request/receive 
supplementary allotments from central authorities if required. 
 Human Resources (HR): This theme relates to the appointment/management, 
deployment and oversight of health sector personnel.  Questions focus on mechanisms to 
ensure adequate hiring/posting/oversight/training of personnel.  Examples of specific 
topics and/or survey questions include: use of performance management tools; Human 
Resources Management (HRM) processes such as requesting/filling new posts, transfers, 
and use of contracting; resources available for personnel motivation. 
 Service Organization and Delivery (SOD): This theme relates to implementation of 
current programs and activities that are both centrally mandated (or expected) and locally 
initiated.  Questions focus on the extent to which services and programs are actually 
delivered and/or adapted locally.  Examples of specific topics and/or survey questions 
include: whether respondents carry out centrally mandated (or expected) programs 
without any local adaptation, or whether such programs are locally reshaped to adjust to 
local priorities; whether respondents initiated new/non-centrally mandated programs or 
services; procurement practices. 
 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): This theme relates to use of data for monitoring 
and evaluation of current activities.  Questions — all of which are considered indicators 
of capacity — focus on who participates (and to what extent) in monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 Local Support (LS):  This theme relates to support provided to the health sector by PRI 
and other civil society bodies.  Specific topics and/or survey questions include: 
availability and use of PRI-generated funds for the health sector; and support 
of/cooperation by PRI bodies for health sector initiatives.  Questions asked of civil 
service administrators are considered indicators of accountability, while those asked of 
PRI officials are considered indicators of capacity. 
 Decision-making in PRIs (PRI): This theme — only applicable to elected officials — 
relates to the functioning of PRIs.  Questions focus on the nature of involvement in PRI 
meetings and decision regarding funds and activities.  Examples of specific topics and/or 
survey questions include: how often elected bodies meet; how decisions are made; to 
what extent guidelines from above affect decisions. 
2.4 Sampling approach 
Purposive sampling strategies were used to select both area-level sampling units and individual-
level respondents.  Area-level units of analysis were selected based on a purposive, multi-stage 
stratified sampling strategy.  Six districts were selected in the first stage, followed by two blocks 
from each selected district and one GP from each of the selected blocks. Additionally, from each 
of the selected districts, two Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) were selected for the urban 
respondents.  Districts were purposively selected on the basis of socio-economic indicators 
expected to affect health system performance but not be directly related to health sector 
decentralization (in terms of decision space, capacities and accountability).  Based on this 
approach, the 18 districts of West Bengal were stratified into two clusters — ‘High-ranking’ and 
‘Low-ranking’ — based on the unweighted average of rank scores in per capita income and level 
of urbanization (see Table 13 in Appendix I).
10
  Within each of these clusters, one district was 
selected in which the ZP represented the opposition to the ruling party (the Communist Party of 
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India (Marxist) (CPIM)) of West Bengal.  Selection of the remaining two districts within each 
cluster took into consideration variation in geographical representation of the agro-climatic zones 
of the state. At the sub-district level, blocks were selected to maximize geographical variation 
(e.g., for districts with a north-south spread, one block each was chosen from the northern and 
southern part of the district, respectively).  A similar approach to selection of ULBs was 
followed if possible. Selection of GPs was random from existing GPs in the selected blocks.  
Table 6 presents the selection of area-level sampling units. 
 
Table 6. Districts sampled and characteristics related to area-level criteria for selection 
Rank 
ZP 
political 
orientation 
Geographical 
orientation 
Districts Blocks GPs ULBs 
High 
Ruling 
party 
North 
 Jalpaiguri  Kalchini  Satali  Alipurduar 
 Dhupguri  Malbazar  Moulani 
South 
 Bardhaman  Jamuri  Bahadurpur  Kalna 
 Memari  Purbasthali-I  Nadanghat 
Opposition South 
 Purba Medinipur  Contai-I  Dulalpur  Haldia 
 Tamluk  Panskura-I  Radhaballavchak 
Low 
Ruling 
party 
West 
 Bankura  Chatna  Dhaban  Bishnupur 
 Sonamukhi  Kotulpur  Madanmohunpur 
Southwest 
 Birbhum  Nalhati-II  Nowapara  Bolpur  
 Rampurhat  Dubrajpur  Paduma 
Opposition North 
 Uttar Dinajpur  Chopra  Sonapur  Islampur  
 Kaliyaganj  Itahar  Marnai 
 
The districts included — Jalpaiguri, Uttar Dinajpur, Barddhaman, Bankura, Birbhum and Purba 
Medinipur — are broadly representative of the geographical, socioeconomic and political 
diversity in the state.  Jalpaiguri is at the extreme north, largely agricultural and has a 
considerable proportion of scheduled caste/tribe population.  It also in terms of development and 
health indicators compared to the state average.  Uttar Dinajpur is one of the poorest districts and 
is consistently bottom-ranking across a number of fronts, including low literacy levels and poor 
performance in development indicators.  Barddhaman is one of the best-performing districts in 
the state, and traditionally a powerhouse in terms of agriculture and/or industry and political 
importance.  Its proximity to the state capital (about 100 kilometers away) adds to its strategic 
advantage.  Bankura and Birbhum both exhibit considerable intra-district heterogeneity in 
development processes and outcome indicators.  Bankura has a large proportion of vulnerable 
social groups, widespread poverty in certain pockets and, recently, was affected by the Maoist 
disturbances.  Birbhum, like Barddhaman, has backward pockets that coexist with above-average 
blocks or regions. Finally, Purba Medinipur (a new district carved out of the erstwhile 
Medinipur) is a relatively progressive district and benefits from proximity to Kolkata.  In recent 
years, the district has been witness to a significant political transformation with a notable swing 
of popular support placing the opposition parties at the control of most of the local governments, 
as well as in the parliament constituencies.   
 
It should be noted that often the ranking of the districts alter in view of the indicators chosen, 
except for the persistent low-rankers (e.g., Uttar Dinajpur) and top-notch performers (e.g., 
Barddhaman).  Furthermore, while we have duly considered intra-district representation in 
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selecting sub-district sample respondents (from blocks and Gram Panchayats), an extent of 
arbitrariness exists. Given considerable intra-district variation in the processes and outcomes of 
our interest, this may sometimes lead to findings which cannot be easily generalized.  This is a 
limitation of any sample survey in heterogeneous areas, and thus any generalization should be 
made cautiously. 
 
At the individual level of analysis, the study sampled pre-identified categories of officials 
involved in health sector decision-making at each area unit of analysis from which to sample.  
For some categories, such as CMOs or BMOs, sampling was universal within that sample unit 
(i.e., only one relevant respondent exists at that level of the health system or PRI structure).  For 
other categories, such as ANMs or members of the VHSC, efforts were made to conduct random 
sampling (e.g., selecting sub-centres at random from within the GP and interviewing the relevant 
ANM).  A list of potential respondents was provided to the field investigators, and if any such 
pre-selected respondent was unavailable/post vacant, investigators were instructed to select an 
alternative respondent (of that category) from the next nearest facility or for PRIs, the vice-
president/chairman. 
2.5 Survey implementation 
The surveys were administered during the period September to October, 2009 with official letters 
of introduction obtained by the survey administrator (the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, 
Calcutta (CSSSC)) from the DOHFW.  Survey administration was conducted by six teams of 
interviewers: one for each district and two field investigators per team.  The research teams also 
collected data on performance in financing, human resources and health system indicators from 
both provincial and national sources.  Out of a sampling size of 240 respondents, 225 interviews 
were completed in entirety (for a response rate of 93.7%).
11
  After the survey was completed, the 
authors conducted discussed preliminary findings with the interview team to finalize the data 
coding plan.   
2.6 Data analysis 
The study draws primarily on statistical estimations to analyze relationships between decision 
space, capacities, and accountability, as well as qualitative observations made by interviewers 
during the course of questionnaire implementation.  The following describes the process used to 
transform the survey instruments into data points as well as an overview of the statistical 
estimation techniques used for analysis. 
 
All survey items (questions) included in the analysis were scored on a Likert scale with values 
ranging from one (representing narrow (low) decision space (capacity/accountability)), two 
(representing moderate decision space/capacity/accountability), to three (representing wide 
(high) decision space (capacity/accountability)).  Scoring of survey questions resulted from a 
collaborative process between within the HSPH/CSSSC team.  From these individual 
questionnaire items, two sets of composite indicators of decision space, capacities and 
accountability were generated.  The first set of composite measures comprises summary scores 
of decision space, capacity and accountability calculated for each respondent within a given 
function.
12
  The second set of composite measures comprises summary scores of decision space, 
capacity and accountability calculated for each respondent across all functions.  For both sets of 
measures, composite scores were calculated as the unweighted mean (average) of all relevant 
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individual questions provided by a given respondent
13
; function-specific summary scores 
therefore ranged continuously from one to three. 
 
The composite scores described above were then standardized within each respondent category.  
Because the respondents sampled have varying roles in health sector decision-making, survey 
instruments varied by type of respondent.  While scores for decision space, capacities and 
accountability within a set of respondents are comparable, those across categories are not.
14
  To 
address the lack of comparability of scores across respondent categories, scores for composite 
indicators were standardized within sets of respondents who received identical questionnaires 
(see Table 14 of Appendix I for a listing of sets of respondents with identical questionnaires; see 
Table 15 of Appendix I for a listing of the number of questions for each respondent category by 
function and dimension of decentralization).  Scores were standardized by differencing 
individuals’ scores from their respective group mean and dividing by the standard deviation of 
scores from their group. 
 
To conduct aggregate- (area-) level analyses, aggregate indicators were calculated from the 
standardized scores of individual-level composite indicators. To account for area-level 
differences in the number of respondents sampled within each category, a single standardized 
score for each set of respondents with identical questionnaires was calculated based on the 
unweighted mean of all applicable respondents within a given district.  District-level scores in 
decision space, capacities and accountability were then calculated as the unweighted mean of 
those scores.
15
 
 
There are two major assumptions made by the above-described methodology.  First, it 
fundamentally assumes that the three dimensions of decentralization analyzed (decision space, 
capacities and accountability) can be meaningfully summarized quantitatively into singly 
composite scores, whether function-specific or across all health functions.  Second, because 
summary scores are calculated as unweighted averages of individual survey questions, it assumes 
that the content of each question is equally important within a given decentralization 
dimension/health function.  Among health workers, for example, responses to 
certifying/nominating JSY health insurance beneficiaries receives as much weight in decision 
space in service organization/delivery as suggesting changes/modifications to a set of four 
services identified by the questionnaire (e.g., immunization days).
16
 
 
Bivariate (pairwise) Pearson correlations of coefficients were performed to conduct statistical 
tests of association presented in the findings.  Given the relatively small sample sizes at both the 
individual and area-level units of analysis, correlations are interpreted by this study as 
statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence. 
 
Quantitative findings drawn out through the above-described analytic plan are complemented 
with qualitative observations made during the course of questionnaire implementation.  Field 
interviewers documented summary reports on various study themes (i.e., decision-making 
processes, capacities of different group of respondents, convergence or divergence of responses 
between different types of stakeholders, etc.) based on their observations made during interviews 
and ensuing discussions with the respondents.  Qualitative observations based on these reports, 
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as well as observations made by the CSSSC-affiliated author of this report, are included 
alongside presentation of quantitative findings. 
2.7 Limitations  
This study has five primary limitations.  First, the validity and reliability of the study’s measures 
of decentralization are not known.  This study relies on an exploratory survey methodology to 
measure the extent of decentralization that has not been widely replicated.  Because there is no 
“gold standard” to measure the study themes of health sector decision space, institutional 
capacities or accountability across a range of health functions, the validity and/or reliability of 
the quantitative measures of these dimensions cannot be assessed.
17
  The surveys are therefore 
not akin to many widely applied household surveys (e.g., the Demographic and Health Survey) 
for which many trial instruments have been tested over time and in different contexts to validate 
the content of questions.  Indeed, because formal decision space over various health sector 
functions varies widely by country context and depends greatly on what kinds of individuals are 
involved in decision-making, it would be difficult to validate unless it underwent repeated 
applications in the same country and under the same formal decision space legal context over 
time.  Nonetheless, previous experience with similar instruments in other states of India as well 
as the consultative process by which questionnaires were developed provided reassurance of the 
validity of our decision space, capacity and accountability measures.  Local knowledge of 
stakeholder roles and responsibilities — as well as the health system itself — aided the 
CSSSC/HSPH team in focusing on the most salient aspects of each health function/dimension of 
decentralization; this helped ensure “content validity”.  Previous experience with implementing 
similar surveys in other contexts in India (Orissa and Uttar Pradesh) also aided the 
CSSSC/HSPH team in effectively posing questionnaire items. 
 
Second, the survey relies on self-reported data which, in the context of statistical analyses, may 
result in biases and/or diminished reliability.  As with any self-assessments, the validity and 
reliability of the data revolves in large part around the degree to which answers provided by 
respondents correspond to what actually happens in practice.  While the survey administrators 
stressed their hope that respondents would answer according to what they actually do and not 
necessarily what is written in official rules or regulations, there was no way to verify veracity of 
answers or reliability.  The study had neither the necessary time nor resources to collect 
“objective data” on decision space, institutional capacities or accountability to complement that 
collected by the survey.  It was not possible, for example, to corroborate performance 
management practices reported by health officials’ with documentation (e.g., employee reports) 
related to those practices.  However, it should be noted that this limitation would apply equally to 
commonly utilized alternative methodological choices, such as unstructured interviews, focus 
group discussions, or expert valuations.  Further, interviewer reports suggested that respondents 
were generally cooperative and reported honestly.  Indeed, elected representatives were 
perceived as being particularly enthusiastic and willing to provide honest answers, likely because 
they perceived this study to be a window of opportunity to air their views. While those in the 
civil service tended to view the study more as instruments of protocol requiring administrative 
attention, interviewers still believed that they were providing honest answers. 
 
Third, the study is particularly limited in its assessment of accountability.  Although the study 
hopes to assess downward accountability of local health systems to citizens (see Section 1.2.3 for 
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a definition of “downward” accountability), it is limited to measuring downward accountability 
of health systems to elected PRI officials.  As highlighted in Section 1.2.3, there are many 
reasons that accountability to PRI officials may not equate with accountability to local citizens 
themselves (particularly in the context of West Bengal in which the CPIM has historically 
dominated local politics).  To reiterate one of the primary take-home messages of that section, it 
is left to the reader to decide on the extent to which downward accountability to citizens’ 
representatives in West Bengal, PRI bodies, translates into accountability to citizens themselves.   
 
Fourth, the study is limited in its ability to relate dimensions of decentralization to indicators of 
health sector performance.  Although efforts were made to collect administrative data related to 
health sector performance, such as vacancy rates among health cadres or budget execution rates, 
these data were not available to the study team below the district level of aggregation, and even 
at the district level intermediate indicators of governance performance (such as data on 
absenteeism, or drug stock outs, or budget execution) were not available.  Further, collecting 
individual-level performance data, such as individual performance evaluation reports, was 
beyond the scope of the study.  As a result, the only health systems performance data available 
for analysis were service delivery (such as immunization coverage) district-level indicators.  
Because of severe sample size constraints at the district level of analysis (n = 6 for all 
quantitative findings), the study was unable to meaningfully analyze in a quantitative way 
associations between dimensions of decentralization and service delivery. 
 
Finally, while qualitative findings reported in this study are informative and supplement 
quantitative findings, they are not the culmination of a rigorously designed qualitative research 
strategy.  Conclusions drawn from qualitative findings should therefore be interpreted with 
caution. 
3 Presentation of survey findings 
3.2 Sample characteristics 
As indicated in Table 7, a total of 209 health sector and PRI member respondents were 
interviewed across six districts and 12 blocks in West Bengal (Table 16 and Table 17 in 
Appendix I provide more detail on respondents sampled).  Of those 209 respondents sampled, 
195 were retained for analysis.  The reduction of approximately 15 respondents included for 
analysis was due to two main reasons: respondents of some categories were not able to be 
interviewed across all districts (e.g., PRI VHSC members), and some respondents interviewed 
were not of categories to which the semi-structured questionnaires had been tailored (e.g., PMU 
members).
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  Exclusion of those respondents was not found to qualitatively affect findings 
described in this section. 
 
Table 7. Sample size 
District 
 Health Administrators  Health Workers  PRI Officials  All Respondents 
 Sampled Analyzed  Sampled Analyzed  Sampled Analyzed  Sampled Analyzed 
Jalpaiguri  12 12  7 7  16 13  35 32 
Uttar Dinajpur  11 10  9 9  17 16  37 35 
Bardhaman  14 13  9 8  15 14  38 35 
Bankura  8 7  7 7  15 14  30 28 
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Birbhum  10 10  9 9  15 13  34 32 
Purba Medinipur  13 13  7 7  15 13  35 33 
Total  68 65  48 47  93 83  209 195 
 
Selected characteristics of the respondent pool retained for analysis are presented in Table 8.  
Both health and PRI officials averaged around 43 years of age.  While almost all health 
administrators interviewed were men, a substantially greater percentage of women made up the 
PRI pool of respondents (40%) and the large majority (around 90%) of frontline health workers 
interviewed were women.  In terms of formal education, almost all health administrators 
possessed a college or graduate education (the vast majority holding a MBBS).  Around 50% of 
health workers had finished high school, and around 30% held a graduate degree.  Around 90% 
of health workers reported having received additional professional training, such as nursing or 
ANM training.  Almost 55% of PRI officials held a graduate degree, while around 30% had 
completed secondary school.  Around 10% of PRI officials reported having received additional 
professional training.  In terms of length of service, both health administrators and workers 
averaged at least 10 years of work experience (close to 20 years in the case of health workers), 
with 4 and 10 years of that service, respectively, at their current post.  Close to 60% of PRI 
officials interviewed were first-time electees.  Additionally among PRI respondents, close to 
one-half represented the Communist Party of India (Marxist), 30% represented the Indian 
National Congress, 20% represented the All India Trinamool Congress, and the rest represented 
other parties.  Just over one-half of respondents held reserved seats (for reasons of caste or 
gender). 
 
Table 8. Respondent characteristics 
 
 
Age 
 % 
male 
 Education*  
Years of service / 
# times elected 
 
N 
   Low Medium High  Total At post  
Health Administrators  41.4  0.97  0.00 0.02 0.98  11.9 4.0  65 
Health Workers  43.2  0.11  0.20 0.52 0.28  18.6 10.7  47 
PRI Officials  42.7  0.60  0.14 0.31 0.54  1.7 N/A  83 
* Health Administrators: low/medium = less than university; medium = Bachelor’s; High = graduate; Health 
Workers: low = less than high school; medium = high school; high = graduate; PRI Officials: low = less than 
secondary; medium = secondary/high school; high = graduate 
3.3 Associations between decision space, capacities, and accountability 
One of the two major goals of this study is to address the question: is there evidence that the 
“ingredients” of health sector decentralization — decision space, capacities, and accountability 
— work together synergistically.  This study’s methodology permits statistical estimation of the 
degree of association between those three dimensions of decentralization.  The following 
sections present the results of those estimations at both the individual- (respondent-) and district-
level of analysis. 
3.3.1 Individual-level findings 
The following sections present estimations conducted at the individual/respondent unit of 
analysis.  These include correlations between dimensions of decentralization, between health 
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functions, and between dimensions of decentralization/health functions and respondent 
experience.  Each is presented, in turn. 
3.3.1.1 Inter-dimension correlations 
The following results relate to estimated statistical relationships between dimensions of 
decentralization (i.e., decision space, capacities and accountability) both within a given function 
(e.g., does decision space within one function correlate with capacity in that same function?) and 
across all functions (i.e., is decision space across all functions correlated with capacity across all 
functions?).  The tables presented in the main text refer to findings that pool data across all three 
broad categories of local health sector decision-makers: health administrators, health workers 
and PRI officials.  Given the substantially different role between health administrators, health 
workers and elected officials in decentralized service provision, notable differences in findings 
between these three broad categories of officials are also highlighted in the main text with 
corresponding statistical tables presented in Appendix I. 
 
As indicated in Table 9, composite measures of each of the three dimensions of decentralization 
for a given health function are generally positively correlated with other dimensions, even if 
many are not of statistical significance.  When data are pooled across all respondents, there is 
consistent evidence of synergies between dimensions of decentralization: all three pair-wise 
correlations of summary scores of decision space, capacities and accountability (the rows labeled 
“ALL” in Table 9) are statistically significantly positively correlated with each other (ρ = 0.26 to 
0.35).  This finding is consistent with the assumptions underpinning Figure 1 that synergies 
between the dimensions of decentralization exist.  While there is comparatively less statistical 
evidence of inter-dimension synergies on a function-by-function basis (i.e., many inter-
dimension correlations are not statistically significant within each individual health function), it 
is notable that these associations are nonetheless all positive as well. 
 
Further investigation of findings by type of local decision-maker (i.e., health administrators, 
health workers and PRI officials) reveals the following.  First, among health administrators, 
relationships between overall decision space and the two other dimensions of decentralization 
appear to relate primarily to the strategic and operational planning: there is a significant 
relationship between decision space and capacity within strategic and operational planning (ρ = 
0.41) while there is also a significantly positive correlation of decision space with accountability 
at the 10% confidence level (ρ = 0.24).  Among health workers, correlations between decision 
space and capacities within both strategic and operational planning/budgeting are significant (ρ = 
0.41 and 0.40) as is decision space and accountability in budgeting (ρ = 0.46).  Collectively, 
these findings suggest that an emphasis on integrated planning and budgeting of financial 
resources for health services may be warranted to capitalize on synergies between dimensions of 
decentralization within these health functions. 
 
Second, findings among PRI officials are somewhat similar to findings among health 
administrators: although no capacity/accountability correlations are significant within any one 
health function, there is a statistically significant positive correlation (ρ = 0.37) in relation to the 
composite cross-function indicators.  This finding suggests that the exercise of downward 
accountability (to PRIs) is associated with greater institutional capacities.  Again, this finding is 
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consistent with assumption made by Figure 1 for conditions needed for decentralization to 
realize its objectives. 
 
Table 9.  Associations between dimensions of decentralization, by respondent category 
Function
†
 
 DS/CAP
††
  DS/ACC
††
  CAP/ACC 
 Ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
All respondents           
SOP  0.41 ** 112  0.11  52  0.14  135 
BUD  0.16 * 112  0.30 ** 98  0.06  143 
HR  0.16  74  0.18  55  0.11  52 
SOD  0.12  112  0.17 * 112  0.21 ** 195 
ALL  0.34 ** 112  0.26 ** 112  0.35 ** 195 
Health Administrators           
SOP  0.41 ** 65  0.11  52  0.11  52 
BUD  -0.01  65  0.24 * 65  0.08  65 
HR  0.15  52  0.18  55  0.11  52 
SOD  0.16  65  0.15  65  0.43 ** 65 
ALL  0.25 ** 65  0.17  65  0.49 ** 65 
Health Workers           
SOP  0.41 ** 47         
BUD  0.40 ** 47  0.46 ** 33  -0.17  33 
HR  0.32  22         
SOD  0.05  47  0.19  47  -0.04  47 
ALL  0.46 ** 47  0.38 ** 47  0.09  47 
PRI members           
SOP          0.15  83 
BUD          0.17  45 
HR             
SOD          0.17  83 
ALL          0.37 ** 83 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
† 
SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization 
††
 DS only applicable to health officials 
 
Box 1. Summary of findings — inter-dimension correlations 
 There is statistical evidence of synergies among the three dimensions of decentralization: decision space, 
capacities and accountability.  This suggests that individuals and local health systems with greater capacities 
tend to take more innovative decisions and are held more accountable for those decisions to local elected 
officials. 
 Overall synergies among the three dimensions of decentralization may depend on the role of local decision-
maker and stakeholder involved.  Among health officials, strong relationships with decision space were found 
within strategic and operational planning and/or budgeting.  For PRI officials, no strong relationships were 
found between capacities and accountability within a given health function, but an overall positive relationship 
was found. 
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3.3.1.2 Inter-function correlations 
The following results relate to estimated statistical relationships within each dimension of 
decentralization (i.e., decision space, capacities and accountability) across functions (e.g., how 
does decision space within one function correlate with decision space in another?).   As with 
findings from the previous section, Table 10 suggests that correlations between functions and 
within dimensions of decentralization are generally positive.  When data are pooled across all 
respondents, there is consistent evidence that decision space, capacities or accountability in one 
function is positively related to that same dimension of decentralization in another function.  For 
decision space, all inter-function correlations are positive and statistically significant (most at the 
5% level of confidence).
19
  Similarly for capacities, the majority of inter-function correlations are 
significantly positive.  While there is comparatively less strong evidence of significantly positive 
correlations in accountability, the vast majority are nonetheless positive and several are 
significant.  Significantly positive coefficients of correlation range from relatively modest (e.g., ρ 
= 0.17 for capacities in service organization and delivery) to relatively strong (e.g., ρ = 0.50 for 
decision space in service organization and delivery).   
 
Two main implications can be drawn from these findings.  First, as in the previous section, they 
provide further statistical evidence that is consistent with the premise that underlies Figure 1.  
Second, they suggest that the summary measures of decision space and capacities presented in 
Table 9 are quite good reflections of decision space and capacities that exist within a particular 
health function.  The overall measure of decision space, in other words, reflects synergies that 
exist between decision space in various health functions, as do overall measures in capacities and 
accountability. 
 
Further investigation of findings by type of local decision-maker suggests the following. Several 
correlations having to do with strategic and operational planning are significant among health 
administrators (with those coefficients of correlation ranging from 0.27 to 0.46), and are 
somewhat more widespread across functions among health workers (ρ = 0.40 to 0.64).  In terms 
of capacity, several correlations among health administrators are significantly positive (ρ = 0.22 
to 0.34).  Of particular note, three of the four statistically significant positive correlations in 
capacity relate to monitoring and evaluation.  This implies that capacities in monitoring and 
evaluation of health sector activities are positively correlated to planning processes for those 
activities, budgeting to make those activities possible, and actual delivery of services.  This 
finding may suggest the critical importance of this function to other aspects of capacity and a 
possible entry point for interventions.  Additionally, local support (considered a measure of 
accountability among health administrators) is significantly correlated with accountability in 
both human resources and service organization and delivery at the 10% level of confidence (ρ = 
0.25 and 0.26, respectively).  Indeed, local support is significantly correlated with the summary 
measure of accountability of health sector functions (ρ = 0.16; p = 0.09; estimate not shown in 
Table 10).  This finding suggests that the degree of local support provided by PRI officials to the 
health sector — such as in supporting new health sector activities or actively participating in 
health sector-related development schemes — is linked to the degree of accountability demanded 
by those same PRI officials.  
   
A mixed picture emerges for inter-function correlations in accountability among health 
administrators. On the one hand, there are some statistically significant positive correlations 
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involving strategic and operational planning, human resources, service organization/delivery and 
local support (ρ = 0.25 to 0.31).  On the other hand, there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation (at the 10% level of confidence) between accountability for budgeting and for service 
organization/delivery (ρ = -0.23).  This would suggest that health administrators who report 
higher levels of accountability in budgeting (measured by a higher degree of involvement of PRI 
officials in budgeting decisions) also perceive a lower level of accountability in the organization 
and delivery of services (measured through such indicators as attendance at Samiti meetings and 
degree of involvement of PRI officials in such service delivery activities as coverage surveys and 
maternal death audits).  One interpretation of this unusual finding is that, while some 
administrators feel that the PRI has a legitimate interest in how funds are budgeted (as in most 
democratic systems funding may be seen as a political decision), they may also feel that the 
operations and organization are more technical and administrative and that, as professionals, they 
should be able to make decisions without recourse to PRI officials.  This would be consistent 
with the legacy of a British system that, in theory, separated administration from political policy 
decisions and created a professional administrative staff with expertise in organization and 
administration.  Whatever the explanation, it is notable that this finding represents the only 
significant negative correlation found among all the statistical estimations analyzed for this 
report.   
 
On the other hand, there is no evidence of significant inter-function correlations in capacity 
among health workers, which suggests that broad-based capacity building aimed at this cadre 
may be of particular need.  As with capacity, there is no evidence of significant inter-function 
correlations in accountability among health workers, which is not surprising given the lack of 
synergy between capacity and accountability for health workers noted in Section 3.3.1.1. 
 
Among PRI officials, there is also evidence of synergies between functions in terms of capacity 
and accountability.  On the capacity side, local support in particular correlates significantly with 
two other functions (strategic and operational planning (ρ = 0.30) and budgeting (ρ = 0.22)).  
This suggests that planning and budgeting practices associated with higher capacity (e.g., 
consultative processes to determine health priorities; using data to inform planning/budgeting; 
having a higher budget execution rate) is positively linked with actual support extended by PRI 
officials for health sector activities (e.g., mobilizing funds; attempting to get additional staff 
posts filled).  On the accountability side, there is evidence of positive associations between 
service organization/delivery and budgeting/human resources (ρ = 0.46 and 0.24, respectively). 
This suggests that PRI involvement in at least some aspects of local service delivery that 
comprise the study’s measures of accountability (such as deciding about funds for health 
services/activities, having an active role in staffing decisions, and overseeing provision of those 
funded and staffed services) may work together synergistically. 
 
Table 10.  Associations within dimensions of decentralization, by respondent category 
1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function 
DS
††
  CAP
¶
  ACC
¶¶
 
ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
All respondents 
SOP & 
BUD 0.22 ** 112  0.13 * 195  0.13  97 
HR 0.28 ** 87  -0.01  92  0.17 * 127 
SOD 0.50 ** 112  0.17 ** 195  0.04  135 
M&E     0.33 ** 65     
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1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function 
DS
††
  CAP
¶
  ACC
¶¶
 
ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
LS     0.30 ** 72  0.10  52 
BUD & 
HR 0.32 ** 87  -0.14  92  0.17 * 100 
SOD 0.19 ** 112  0.04  195  0.09  143 
M&E     0.34 ** 65     
LS     0.22 * 72  0.04  98 
HR & 
SOD 0.21 * 87  0.09  92  0.16 * 138 
M&E     0.10  52     
LS         0.25 * 55 
SOD & 
M&E     0.22 * 65     
LS     0.18  72  0.16 * 112 
Health Administrators 
SOP & 
BUD 0.27 ** 65  0.05  65  0.23  52 
HR 0.32 ** 65  -0.09  52  0.31 ** 44 
SOD 0.46 ** 65  0.12  65  -0.02  52 
M&E     0.33 ** 65     
LS         0.10  52 
BUD & 
HR 0.20  65  -0.09  52  0.15  55 
SOD 0.05  65  -0.04  65  -0.23 * 65 
M&E     0.34 ** 65     
LS         0.19  65 
HR & 
SOD 0.17  65  0.24 * 52  0.02  55 
M&E     0.10  52     
LS         0.25 * 55 
SOD & 
M&E     0.22 * 65     
LS         0.26 ** 65 
Health Workers 
SOP & 
BUD 0.14  47  0.19  47     
HR 0.14  22  0.10  40     
SOD 0.54 ** 47  0.19  47     
M&E            
LS            
BUD & 
HR 0.64 ** 22  -0.22  40     
SOD 0.40 ** 47  0.15  47  0.22  33 
M&E            
LS         -0.27  33 
HR & 
SOD 0.34  22  -0.12  40     
M&E            
LS            
SOD & 
M&E            
LS         0.02  47 
PRI Officials 
SOP & 
BUD     0.16  83  0.02  45 
HR         0.10  83 
SOD     0.20 * 83  0.08  83 
M&E            
LS     0.30 ** 72     
PRI     0.15  83     
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1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function 
DS
††
  CAP
¶
  ACC
¶¶
 
ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
BUD & 
HR         0.21  45 
SOD     0.04  83  0.46 ** 45 
M&E            
LS     0.22 * 72     
PRI     0.23 ** 83     
HR & 
SOD         0.24 ** 83 
M&E            
LS            
PRI     0.00 ## 0  0.00 ## 0 
SOD & 
M&E            
LS     0.18  72     
PRI     0.04  83     
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
† 
SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization; M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation; LS = Local Support; PRI = PRI decision-making 
††
 DS only applicable to health officials 
¶
  LS in CAP only applicable to PRI officials (see Section 2.3.2) 
¶¶
 LS in ACC only applicable to health officials (see Section 2.3.2) 
 
Box 2. Summary of findings — inter-function correlations 
 There is consistent evidence from both health administrators and PRI officials that levels of decision space, 
capacities or accountability in one health function (e.g., strategic and operational planning) are synergistically 
related with levels of those same dimensions of decentralization within another function (e.g., budgeting or 
human resources).   
 Among health administrators, cross-function relationships are strongest in terms of decision space and 
capacities.  Of particular note among health administrators, capacity in monitoring and evaluation correlates 
positively with three of four other health functions suggesting the importance of capacity in this functional area. 
 Among PRI officials, cross-function relationships extend to both capacities and accountability.  Of particular 
note, capacity in local support correlates positively with three of four other health functions suggesting that 
greater PRI involvement may be an entry point to strengthening overall local health systems capacities. 
3.3.1.3 Dimensions of decentralization and respondent experience 
Individuals with greater personal experience may be more willing to make use of their 
decentralized decision-making authority compared to those with less experience.  On the health 
official side, for example, individuals with greater experience may be inclined to make 
innovative decisions whereas those with less experience may feel more comfortable in making 
decisions that stay safely in the status quo.  Similarly, on the elected officials side, the degree to 
which PRI members hold health officials accountable may be in part a function of those 
members own experience.  On both sides, greater personal experience may also go hand-in-hand 
with greater capacities to make decisions that are likely to improve local health system 
performance.  This section explores possible relationships between the professional experience 
of our respondents and dimensions of decentralization (experience of respondents was measured 
through indices combining aspects of respondent education, age, and length of service in their 
respective positions).
20
 
 
As indicated in Table 11, there is evidence of synergies between experience and dimensions of 
decentralization among both health workers and PRI officials, although no evidence among 
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health administrators.  Specifically, both decision space and capacities are positively and 
significantly correlated with the health worker index of experience (ρ = 0.29 and 0.27, 
respectively) and capacities are positively correlated with the PRI official index of experience (ρ 
= 0.27).  While there may be several explanations for the lack of relationships among health 
administrators, one reason might be that health administrators operate at higher levels of the 
system compared to health workers: With a greater number of other stakeholders involved in 
decision-making at those levels of the system, one respondent’s personal experience may not 
greatly impact the decision space, capacities or accountability that operate at that level of the 
health system.
21
  Conversely, as frontline workers interacting with relatively fewer other 
stakeholders in decentralization, a health worker’s personal experience may more greatly impact 
those dimensions of decentralization, particularly their own decision space and capacities.  
Compared to health administrators, for example, the greater opportunity of health workers to 
interact with PRI officials on a day-to-day basis may result in greater influence in the 
decentralization process at that level; greater personal capacities, in turn, may therefore facilitate 
greater involvement in decision-making and contribution to institutional capacities.  Among PRI 
officials, the relatively recent assumption of greater health sector responsibilities under 
decentralization (particularly in the context of NRHM) may drive the relationship between 
experience and capacities.  While it is not known why similar relationships do not exist in terms 
of accountability, it could be that the degree to which PRI officials exert greater influence over 
decisions (which is encapsulated in the study’s concept of accountability) is slower to develop in 
conjunction with personal experience than possessing greater capacities to make appropriate 
decisions. 
 
Table 11.  Respondent experience and dimensions of decentralization 
Respondent 
Category 
DS  CAP  ACC 
ρ N  ρ N  ρ N 
Health 
Administrators 
0.08 65  -0.02 65  -0.19 65 
Health Workers 0.29 ** 48  0.27 * 48  0.14 48 
PRI N/A   0.27 ** 93  0.03 93 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
 
Box 3. Summary of findings — respondent experience and dimensions of decentralization 
 There is evidence from both health workers and PRI officials that respondent experience is synergistically 
related to wider decision space and/or higher capacities; no such evidence is found among health administrators. 
3.3.2 District-level findings 
The following sections present findings at an aggregated (area) unit of analysis.  These include 
district-level levels of decentralization/health functions, as well as correlations between levels of 
decentralization reported by health officials versus those reported by PRI officials.  Each is 
presented, in turn. 
3.3.2.1 Comparative levels of decision space, capacities, and accountability 
The following presents levels of decision space, capacities, accountability both within and across 
functions aggregated to the district level (see Section 2.6 for detail on the methodology used to 
aggregate respondent-level scores to the aggregate level).  This permits comparison of levels of 
dimensions of decentralization across districts.  Findings that pool across health and PRI officials 
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alike are presented in the following section, with references made to findings that consider 
district levels of decision space, capacities and accountability separately for the three broad 
categories of officials interviewed (i.e., health administrators, health workers and PRI officials; 
findings that disaggregate by these three categories of officials are presented in Figure 6 – Figure 
9 of Appendix I). 
 
Figure 2 – Figure 5 present snapshots of levels of decision space, capacities and accountability 
across districts.  On the left of each figure, bar charts present standardized scores of each 
dimension of decentralization, by district.  Charts on the right of each figure arrange districts 
according to their rank order for each dimension of decentralization and health function (with 
lowest-ranking districts assigned a “1” and highest-ranking districts assigned a “6”).  These latter 
charts facilitate a comparison of districts in relation to each other.  In some districts, survey 
results suggest widespread convergence among all officials interviewed of levels of decision 
space, capacities and accountability.  In Birbhum and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Purba 
Medinipur, levels of each dimension of decentralization are generally in among the top of the 
districts sampled (and disaggregated analyses suggest general convergence in valuations made 
by health administrators, health workers and PRI officials; see Figure 6 – Figure 9 of Appendix 
I).  Conversely, levels in Uttar Dinajpur are almost universally in or at the bottom.  In other 
districts, such as Bankura or Purba Medinipur, levels appear to vary by category of respondent, 
across health functions, or both.  The following highlights key findings from these comparisons 
on a district-by-district basis (more detailed analysis of district-level findings are presented in 
Table 23 in Appendix I): 
 
 Birbhum: generally high-scoring across all three dimensions of decentralization and in 
relation to all three categories of officials. 
 Bankura: while generally high scoring, characterized by differences in dimensions of 
decentralization by categories of officials: generally high scoring across all three 
dimensions among health administrators (with exception of M&E capacities), while 
ranked middle-of-the-road or lower among health workers.  Ranked particularly low in 
capacities and average in accountability in relation to PRI officials.  Divergences in 
rankings between health administrators and health workers/PRI officials may be partly a 
function of sampled districts proximity to Kolkata: their close proximity may create 
conditions conducive to decentralization among administrators in the health sector (e.g., 
through good lines of communication) while such attributes don’t spill over to frontline 
health workers or elected PRI officials. 
 Purba Medinipur: while generally high scoring, characterized by differences in 
dimensions of decentralization by categories of officials: generally above-average among 
health administrators (particularly in decision space), middle-of-the road among health 
workers, and mixed for PRI officials (high capacities but below-average accountability).  
 Uttar Dinajpur: almost universally among the lowest-ranked districts across all 
functions, dimensions of decentralization and categories of respondents.  Exceptions 
include a relatively high ranking in M&E capacities by health administrators and high 
overall capacities ranking by health workers.  The latter finding is explained in large part 
by Uttar Dinajpur’s exceptionally high ranking in HR capacity which is centered on 
availability of two cadres of health workers (2
nd
 ANM and ASHAs).  While health 
worker data suggest that Uttar Dinajpur is not lacking for these personnel, exclusion of 
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this function from the overall capacities indicator drops Uttar Dinajpur to a below-
average ranking in capacities. These findings are not surprising given this district’s 
relative level of poverty (see also Section Error! Reference source not found.). 
 Jalpaiguri: among lower-ranked districts in terms of capacities and accountability by 
both health and PRI officials (exceptions include relatively high accountability ranking 
by health workers).  Conversely, Jalpaiguri is among higher-ranked districts by health 
officials in terms of decision space.  This suggests a particular disconnect between health 
official decision space to make innovative decisions and capacities to do so.  Consistent 
with such findings, Jalpaiguri has the lowest-ranked capacities in M&E. 
 Bardhaman: generally among low-middle-ranked districts with some divergence 
between levels reported by health and PRI officials.  Data from health officials (both 
administrators and workers) result in one of the sample’s lower ranking on decision space 
and middle-of-the-road/slightly below average rankings for capacities and decision space.  
Conversely, data suggest PRI officials have slightly higher capacities and one of the top-
ranked districts in terms of accountability.   
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Figure 2. District-level decision space  
  
 
Figure 3. District-level capacities 
  
 
Figure 4. District-level accountability 
  
 
Figure 5. District-level decision space, capacities and accountability 
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3.3.2.2 Inter-stakeholder correlations of dimensions of decentralization 
While the preceding sections have presented evidence consistent with synergies between 
dimensions of decentralization within three broad categories of local decision-makers (health 
administrators, health workers and health officials), such synergies may or may not exist across 
respondent categories.  Such cross-stakeholder synergies may be important for decentralization 
to achieve objectives of improved service delivery as described in Figure 1.  The following 
presents results from estimations comparing levels of dimensions of decentralization reported by 
health officials (health administrators and health workers) to those reported by PRI officials. 
 
As indicated in Table 12, there is some evidence of synergies between levels of decentralization 
reported by both health and PRI officials within a given district.  Specifically, district-level 
accountability reported by health officials (combined health administrators and workers) is 
highly correlated with that reported by PRI officials (ρ = 0.80) and significant at the 10% level of 
confidence even with a (district-level) sample size of six.  This suggests that the degree of 
accountability that health officials feel is present in their district is quite similar to the degree of 
accountability that PRI respondents report exercising.  Conversely, there appears to be very little 
association between the strength of capacities among health officials and that of PRI officials (ρ 
= 0.21 depending on whether capacities in PRI decision-making is included in the district-level 
PRI measure of capacities) or the degree of local support health officials feel is present versus 
that PRI officials report extending (ρ = 0.07). 
 
Table 12.  District-level associations between dimensions of decentralization reported by health and PRI 
officials 
CAP
†
  ACC  LS 
ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
0.21  6  0.80 * 6  0.07  6 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
 
Box 4. Summary of findings — inter-stakeholder correlations of dimensions of decentralization 
 Both health officials and PRI representatives report consistent views of the degree of accountability between 
them.  However, they differ in their reporting on their capacities and on the level of local support. 
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4 Conclusions and recommendations 
4.2 Summary of major findings 
In West Bengal, India and around the world, countries are re-organizing health systems in 
increasingly decentralized ways.  However, as suggested by Figure 1 (see Section 1.1), a 
combination of ingredients must work together synergistically for decentralization to realize its 
potential as a policy that will improve delivery of services.  Decentralization’s “necessary 
ingredients” may include an appropriate endowment of decision-making space for local decision-
makers to adapt local health systems to local health priorities, sufficient institutional capacities 
for local officials to make decisions that are consistent with improved performance, and 
adequately developed mechanisms of accountability to ensure that decisions respond to area-
wide health needs.  This study has attempted to shed insight on the degree to which 
decentralization of health services in West Bengal is conducive to improving service delivery by 
addressing two main research questions: do the “necessary ingredients” of decentralization work 
together in ways that can be expected to improve service delivery. 
 
This study finds consistent evidence that the three dimensions of decentralization that were 
analyzed work together synergistically.  Quantitative analyses of indicators of dimensions of 
decentralization — decision space, capacities and accountability —across a variety of health 
functions — strategic and operational planning, budgeting, human resources and service 
organization/delivery — finds statistical evidence of a variety of synergies.  It finds that, for 
certain functions and among certain local decision-makers, one dimension of decentralization in 
a given function is positively related to another dimension of decentralization in that same 
function.  Among health officials, for example, decision space in strategic and operational 
planning is positively linked to capacities in that same function.  The study also finds evidence 
suggesting that synergies exist not only across dimensions of decentralization but between them.  
That is, the degree of decision space, capacities or accountability in one health function (e.g., 
budgeting) is synergistically related to the degree of that same dimensions within another 
function (e.g., strategic and operational planning).  As important as relationships between 
functions study findings suggest that decision space, capacities and accountability across all 
health functions are synergistically linked — a finding that applies to both health and elected 
officials alike.  
 
These findings suggest that, in the context of West Bengal, the pre-conditions that many feel are 
necessary for decentralization to be an appropriate policy lever for improving health services are 
present.  Administrators and workers in the health sector who take greater responsibilities, more 
actively tailor choices to local conditions, or whose decisions are not subject to as much revision 
from above, for example, also do so in the context of local health systems characterized by 
greater institutional capacities (e.g., better processes, adequate stock of resources) and with a 
higher degree of accountability towards PRIs for those decisions.  Similarly, PRI officials who 
more actively demand accountability for health official decisions appear to have greater capacity 
to do so.  Further, each dimension of decentralization appears to build on itself.  Those who are 
more active decision-makers in one function, for instance, tend to be more active in another; the 
same is applicable in terms of capacities and accountability. 
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While these findings are encouraging, qualitative observations made by interview teams during 
the course of study suggest that there are reasons to treat them with caution.  A first reason 
relates to the actual quality of health sector decision-making — an aspect that the quantitative 
analyses are not able to fully explore.  Although the quantitative findings documented positive 
synergies within and between various health functions, it may be that the overall quality of 
planning surrounding these functions remains sub-standard.  According to interviewer reports 
and observations made by the research team, for example, health sector planning is often viewed 
as a routine, tokenistic exercise that may not adequately be meeting basic objectives.  Many 
health sector respondents, for instance, characterized the identification of vulnerable pockets — 
an important aspect of local need assessment — as being conducted in a “pre-determined” 
fashion involving largely copying content from earlier plans into current District Health Action 
Plans.  Preparing budgets and financial planning was also found to be commonly viewed as a 
purely administrative requirement consisting of simple projections from the previous year’s 
sanctioned budget and with allocations made mechanically/without systematic review. 
Inadequacies in financial planning within local planning instruments currently promoted under 
NRHM can be inferred from the finding that hardly any respondents — even high-level officials 
such as CMOHs — were able to provide accurate verbal estimates of the extent of utilization of 
funds received (those provided were often found to be inconsistent when cross-checked with 
budgets/ District Health Action Plans). 
 
A second reason has to do with the quality of involvement of stakeholders outside the health 
sector.  Though decentralized institutional arrangements encourage participation of the PRIs in 
health sector decision-making, a lack of awareness by and previous experience of PRI members 
may continue to be stumbling blocks.  In some cases, interviewers noted a reluctance of health 
officials and other civil service administrators to encourage greater PRI participation within 
designated inter-sectoral bodies and committees, such as RKSs and D/BHFWSs.  More often 
than not, discussions with respondents suggest that health officials dominate the proceedings of 
these bodies with PRI functionaries having little or non-significant roles during proceedings.  In 
other cases, and perhaps partly as a result, PRI members often appeared to view the health 
system as too “technical” and best managed by health officials.  Further, though PRI members in 
general were felt to be motivated, enthusiastic, energetic, and aware of local health problems and 
vulnerabilities, the current maze of rules, regulations, and bureaucratic red-tape (which the 
decentralization process has not been able to simplify) continue to thwart greater involvement.  
The process of submission of utilization certificates, for instance, appears to be excessively 
complicated, often leading to delays in release of funds such as those related to JSY activities.  
Additionally, instances of deliberate delay and non-cooperation by other line departments 
(notably the Public Works and Public health Engineering departments) under the guise of 
“technical” interventions, may add to the problem.   
 
Such dynamics and processes may help explain a considerable lack of mutual trust or desire by 
health and PRI officials to work jointly on health sector matters.  At the same time, it was 
observed that PRI involvement at the block level was better than at the district level.  One reason 
may be that Block Development Officers are in closer contact with PRI officials (both physically 
located within the Panchayat Samiti and interacting daily to a greater degree with PS officials 
than at the district level).  The BDO is therefore often instrumental as a bridge linking health 
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sector administrators (e.g., BMOH) and PRI officials, perhaps resulting in a higher degree of 
convergence of perceptions.   
 
Additionally, the study finds that an individual’s own personal capacities may also be an 
important element in the above-described synergies of decentralization.  Among both health 
workers and PRI officials sampled in this study, measures of personal experience are positively 
associated with those individual’s decision space and/or capacities; for higher-level health 
administrators, no such connections were observed.  These findings are consistent with 
qualitative observations made by interviewers during survey administration.  Outreach workers 
have greater exposure to health services beneficiaries and PRI officials which, over time, likely 
leads to better relations than with higher-level health administrators.  Indeed, regular meeting on 
the fourth Saturday of each month between of the ANMs/HAs and PRI officials are well-
attended by ANMs/HAs where they are seen to follow both the letter and spirit of requirements 
to provide monthly reports of activities and discuss any problems faced. These respondents 
tended to more highly rate interactions with PRI officials such as calling relations “generally 
cooperative” or that PRI officials “helps as and when necessary”, than higher-level health sector 
administrators.  Among PRI officials, it was observed that the majority of the freshly elected 
members and those elected from reserved constituencies were wanting in independent decision-
making as well as familiarity with health sector roles and responsibilities.  This further suggests 
that personal experience is particularly important among these health sector decision-makers. 
 
These findings suggest that future capacity building endeavors might be tailored differently to 
different cadres of local decision-makers.  For those who are closer to actual services delivered, 
such as frontline health workers and PRI officials at lower levels of the system, focusing on 
training and education on roles and responsibilities under decentralization may be a productive 
policy option to improve services.  For higher-level officials (e.g., health administrators and 
district-level PRI members), a focus on system-wide processes may be more productive (e.g., 
adequate use of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms).  However, the study found resistance to 
decentralization among these officials and that therefore they would benefit from greater 
interaction with PRIs. 
 
4.3 Policy recommendations 
Findings from this study suggest a number of policy recommendations that can be made to 
strengthen the process of decentralization and ultimately, it is hoped, improve health sector 
performance.  Policy recommendations for West Bengal as a whole as well as the districts 
sampled in this study are provided, below. 
4.3.1 Overall 
This study suggests a strong compatibility exists among the three dimensions of decentralization 
analyzed: decision space, capacities and accountability.  Though the study is unable to assess 
causality in such relationships, the interaction between the dimensions of decentralization is 
suggestive that policy changes that affect one of the dimensions might encourage changes in 
another.   
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While in the long-term an end goal of policy interventions might be a greater exercise of decision 
space or local accountability by local officials, it is likely that a number of capacity-building 
interventions are more feasible types of policy change that can be undertaken by the government 
of West Bengal in the short-term and/or for external partners to encourage.  Capacity-building 
options motivated this study’s findings include: 
1. Training and education on roles and responsibilities under decentralization should 
be focused on frontline health workers and PRI officials.  The strongest linkages 
between personal experience and exercise of authorities, capacities and degree of 
accountability are found among health workers and PRI officials.  This suggests that 
these local decision-makers may experience the greatest benefits from further training 
and education in decentralized service delivery.  Examples include follow-up training for 
health workers in interacting with PRI officials (e.g., role of ANMs during VHSC 
meetings; role as co-administrator of annual maintenance grants), and technical 
assistance to PRI officials on their roles (e.g., in monitoring and certification of doctor 
attendance or approval of casual leave of health officials).  Qualitative observations made 
by interview teams support this recommendation, as a majority of the freshly elected PRI 
members and those elected from reserved constituencies were felt to be wanting in 
familiarity with, and willingness to independently exercise, their roles and responsibilities 
in health sector decision-making. Targeted orientation among such PRI members — such 
as providing orientation in the scope of public health programs beyond the provision of 
drinking water and basic sanitation — might therefore be particularly useful. 
2. Capacity building oriented towards building institutional processes should be 
directed at health administrators.  Relatively weak linkages between personal 
experience and decentralization among health administrators suggest that further training 
on roles and responsibilities specific to decentralization may not be necessary or 
warranted.  Instead, capacity building initiatives at higher levels of the system (e.g., 
district, block) should focus on strengthening area-wide processes that are likely to lead 
to better performance.  Based on this study’s findings, two specific recommendations can 
be made: 
a. Focus on strengthening of monitoring and evaluation.  As capacity in M&E 
among health administrators was found by this study to be consistently related to 
capacity in all dimensions, policy initiatives to strengthen M&E capacity might 
have a multiplier effect in capacity building and might be an entry point for 
capacity-building initiatives.  For example, the DOHFW could develop and 
disseminate standards for M&E processes at different levels of the system (e.g., 
expected regularity with which expenditures, staff attendance, etc. are monitored).  
b. Continued emphasis on building capacities in strategic and operational 
planning.  With capacities in strategic and operational planning linked to higher 
decision space in that same function among health officials of all cadres, capacity 
building in this function could serve as an entry point for capacity-building 
initiatives.  As an example, the DOHFW could consider a refresher course in 
NRHM planning and subsequent provision technical assistance in developing 
DHAPs. 
3. Ensure coherence between capacity building initiatives oriented towards health 
officials and those aimed at PRI officials.  This study did not find linkages between 
capacities reported by health officials and those reported by PRI officials.  Given that 
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local health sector decision-making involves both sets of officials — and that this study 
consistently finds synergies between capacities and other aspects of decentralization — 
this suggests that greater attention should be given to simultaneously building capacities 
of stakeholders working in the health sector and those elected by local constituents. 
4. Emphasize local support to the health sector as a means of promoting greater 
accountability.  This study found linkages between the degree of local support made by 
PRI officials to the health sector — both financial and in terms of active involvement in 
promoting health sector activities — with the degree of accountability exercised.  It also 
found positive associations between both accountability over health functions and local 
support with district-level health sector performance.  However, there was also a notable 
disconnect between perceptions of local support provided between health and PRI 
officials.  This combination of findings suggests that advocacy for increasing local 
support to the health sector could help bring health sector and PRI officials on the same 
page, further strengthen the degree of accountability felt by both and, to the extent that 
accountability is independently linked to performance, promote better health sector 
performance itself.  Examples of policy initiatives oriented towards local support include 
exchange of information between districts on innovative partnerships between PRIs 
bodies and the health sector to promote new health activities, or advocacy towards the 
government of West Bengal to establish separated PRI/ULB budgets devoted to health 
sector activities in under-performing districts. 
5. Districts that are consistently weak along all dimensions and performance should be 
given priority for capacity building as the entry point for reform.  According to this 
study’s findings, the district of Uttar Dinajpur should be given highest priority in capacity 
building on all fronts.  More detailed recommendations are made in the following section 
on a district-by-district basis. 
 
In addition to capacity building the study suggests that policies related to decision space and 
accountability might be pursued.  These include: 
1. Promote exchange of information among health officials in high decision space with 
those with low decision space on how to exercise greater choice.  In districts, where 
officials report low decision space it may be the result of inertia or lack of information 
about the possibility of making more decisions and/or decisions that are not simply 
extensions of those handed down from higher levels (that is, those that take local 
circumstances into greater account).  In such cases, informing officials in districts with 
low decision space that their counterparts in districts with high decision space are making 
more use of their formal abilities — and that it is possible to do so — might be a means 
to improve decentralized decision-making.  Among the districts sampled in this study, 
Birbhum is a good candidate for hosting exchange of such information with districts 
where decision space is low (e.g., Uttar Dinajpur). 
2. Promote exchange of information between health and PRI officials on exercise of 
accountability building on existing block-level synergies.  This study demonstrates that 
health officials generally view the level of accountability exercised by PRI officials 
similarly to the degree to which PRI officials feel they are able to exercise accountability.  
For accountability, more information about higher levels of accountability might 
overcome lack of interest in improving relationships between administrators and elected 
officials might spark new initiatives in the low accountability districts.  Qualitative 
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observations made by study interviewers further suggest that blocks, with the BDO in 
close proximity to PRI officials and often instrumental as a bridge linking block-level 
health and PRI officials, may be the most appropriate level of the system at which to 
promote exchange of information. 
4.3.2 District-by-district 
 Birbhum: given highly rated decision space, capacities and accountability by all 
categories of officials, the government of West Bengal could consider using as site for 
capacity building activities directed at other districts and inter-district information 
exchanges. 
 Bankura: need for across-the-board capacity building focused on PRI officials to bring 
in alignment with capacities of health officials.  May be able to channel PRI capacity-
building initiatives through health officials given the relatively high levels of 
accountability felt by health officials. 
 Purba Medinipur: need for capacity-building among health workers to bring in 
alignment with capacities of health administrators and PRI officials and balance  
relatively high degree of decision space. 
 Uttar Dinajpur: capacity building on all fronts and among all stakeholders/decision-
makers involved.  Given the relative poverty of this district (with a per capita income the 
lowest of all district in West Bengal) and weak health system infrastructure, capacity 
building in decentralization likely needs to be part of a larger program of health system 
strengthening. 
 Jalpaiguri: need for across-the-board emphasis in capacity-building among both health 
and PRI officials, particularly in light of relatively wide decision space assumed by health 
officials.  Among health administrators, a particular emphasis on capacities in monitoring 
and evaluation among health administrators is also warranted. 
 Bardhaman: Need for capacity-building focused at health officials to bring into 
alignment with those of PRI officials.  A particular emphasis on capacities in strategic 
and operational planning and human resources (particularly among health workers) is 
warranted.  May be able to use particularly high levels of accountability exercised by PRI 
officials as springboard to strengthen oversight of capacity initiatives among health 
officials. 
4.3.3 For upcoming decentralization initiative and further analysis 
As the government of West Bengal seeks to further strengthen health sector decentralization, 
results from these findings may be of use in informing the shape of the State’s upcoming 
initiative on decentralization.  In addition to considering the recommendations cited, above, 
further qualitative research into understanding why some districts appear to rate highly on both 
decentralization and health sector performance dimensions and some rate poorly on both could 
be of great use.  Findings from this study suggest that such investigations would be most useful 
in the districts of Birbhum (i.e., a relatively high-performing district) and Uttar Dinajpur (i.e., a 
relatively low-performing district) to understand key factors affecting or driving findings from 
this study.  Follow-up studies could investigate which institutional environment factors related to 
processes of decentralization contribute to their observed performance, and whether observed 
performance in terms of decentralization appears to be related to health systems performance and 
quality of service delivery. 
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1
 The AIS officer at the district level is called the District Magistrates (DMs) — who is the most powerful 
district-level government official.  District Magistrates are entrusted with a variety of responsibilities (e.g., 
overseeing law and order; revenue collection/taxation; and planning), including some health sector-related functions.  
Officially designated as district head they are responsible as well as accountable for all the development related 
activities in the district including health.  They usually leave much of the decision making about health to the 
CMOH, however they are required to approve budgets and human resource recruitment, transfers, contracts, and 
performance reviews and sometimes make modifications in decisions of the CMOH. 
2
 Brief descriptions of the roles of these decision-makers are also discussed in Box 1, with further description of 
decision-making processes related to the health functions analyzed provided in Appendix II.  Additional detail on 
roles and responsibilities of each cadre of official is presented in Appendix III 
3
 See also Notification No. Strategic Planning System Reform Cell/106 dated February 23, 2004. 
4
  The UK Department For International Development has supported HSDI in the form of a budget support grant 
of GBP 97.5 million, released in five annual tranches. 
5
 In November 2005, the GOWB decided to hand over infrastructure maintenance of all primary health care 
facilities to PRIs.  Since then, funds for maintenance and construction of all facilities ranging from Subcentres to 
Rural Hospitals have been channeled through the PRIs, and not the Public Works Department. 
6
 A District Program Management Unit in each district (as well as its block-level counterpart, the BPMU) has been 
constituted under the aegis of NRHM, across all districts and blocks in the state.  DPMUs are staffed by a program 
coordinator, an accounts manager, a data entry operator and a statistical manager.  The DPMU is purely a 
contractual unit, with most of the members/staff contracted locally.  The DPMU assists the CMOH in providing an 
up-to-date summary of health sector programs and health service statistics, helps in preparing the action 
plans/annual budget, and maintain accounts of the funds received under NRHM and other nationally sponsored 
programs (such as RCH-II).  
7
 A regular annual flow of flexible fund from NRHM (Rs. 500,000 to a District Hospital, and Rs. 100,000 to 
each of the other facilities) and a part of collection from user charges (40%) go to RKS. 
8
 As indicated in endnotes 1 and Error! Bookmark not defined., non-health civil service administrators were 
excluded from analysis.  The remainder of the report will refer only to health and PRI respondent officials. 
9
 For elected officials, decision space related to the degree to which locally-made decisions were affected by 
higher-level elected authorities (e.g., whether respondents follow directions of their political parties in terms of 
planning, managing or monitoring health facilities), but relatively few questions along these lines were asked of 
these officials. 
10
 Ideally, districts should be selected based on indicators that are exogenous to decentralization but may affect 
health sector performance. Further, from socio-economic indicators available at the district level, variables having 
the least intra-item correlation are good candidates because they maximize the ability of composite indicators to 
capture distinct dimensions of socio-economic status.  This rationale led to selection of per capita income and level 
of urbanization as constituent indicators of the composite indicator used to rank districts. 
11
 Of the 15 interviews considered to be non-responses: three respondents refused to provide answers, 10 
respondents were not in-position/absent/could not be contacted, and two interviews were incomplete and excluded 
from analysis. 
 42 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 For example, capacity in strategic and operational planning among PRI respondents was assessed through six 
questions, including: the basis of the respondent’s assessment of the top three problems/challenges in public health 
in their locality, the normal frequency of assessing health priorities in their locality, and the degree of involvement 
of other stakeholders (health officials, other civil servants, and PRI bodies) in overall health sector planning 
exercises. 
13
 Some questions had multiple parts or were closely related to each other (e.g., “Are you involved in 
procurement of any of the following items: a. Civil Works; b. Equipment (Diagnostic/OT); c. Equipment 
(Hardware/Stationery); d. Transport & Communication; e. Drugs; f. Other).  Because composite indicators of 
decision space, capacities and accountability were calculated as the unweighted mean of each question, inclusion of 
each of those sub-questions would risk providing them undue weight.  In these instances, the unweighted mean of 
the sub-questions was calculated prior to inclusion in the calculation of the overall composite indicator decision 
space, capacities or accountability. 
14
 For instance, narrow decision space in budgeting for a CMOH is nonetheless almost certainly categorically 
higher than budgeting decision space for an ANM.  Yet because the study’s ANM questionnaire does not include 
budgeting decision space questions relevant only to CMOHs, an ANM and CMOH might end up with exactly the 
same score.  A non-standardized decision space score would therefore erroneously equate the two and could bias 
statistical estimations. 
15
 For example, two respondents of the GP Pradhan/Upa-Pradhan category were sampled in Purba Medinipur 
(equating to 13% of Purba Medinipur’s PRI respondents) whereas four of that same category were sampled in Uttar 
Dinajpur (or 24% of Uttar Dinajpur’s PRI respondents).  If scores were not first averaged within each respondent 
category before averaging within the district, scores for the GP Pradhan/Upa-Pradhan in would be more heavily 
weighted in Uttar Dinajpur compared to Purba Medinipur. 
16
 Methodological alternatives to construction of composite indicators were considered but rejected for statistical 
reasons.  In particular, the feasibility of factor/principal components analysis approaches was constrained by the 
variations in survey items by category of respondent: because the number of respondents with identical 
questionnaires is relatively small in relation to the number of questions for each dimension of decentralization by 
function/overall (see Table 15), factor/principal component analyses were not feasible. 
17
 (Construct) validity can be characterized as measuring what it is that one seeks to measure; reliability can be 
characterized as measuring well what it is that one measured.  While a high degree of construct validity implies a 
high degree of reliability, the converse is not necessarily true. 
18
 Categories of respondent excluded from analysis are: health administrators and workers without identifiable 
categories (n = 4) and non-elected PRI members, including Block Public Health Supervisors, ULB health inspectors, 
DPHC coordinators (ZP) and VHSC members (n = 10).  
19
 Since decision space questions for PRI officials were too few in number to use for analysis, findings relating 
to decision space are applicable only to health officials. 
20
 Standardized indices were created across three broad categories of stakeholders: health administrators, health 
workers and PRI officials.  Component variables of each were: health administrators: age and years experience in 
total, in the area, and at post; health workers: age, years experience in total, in the area, and at post, and previous 
experience in similar post; PRI officials: education level, number of trainings received in general responsibilities and 
public health, respectively, and number of times elected.  Cronbach alpha coefficients of reliability were 0.78, 0.79 
and 0.63, respectively. 
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21
 Alternatively, it could be that relationships do exist among health administrators but that the research 
instrument failed to adequately capture relevant aspects of this experience in its quantitative scales.  
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6 Appendix I 
Table 13. Socio-economic ranking of districts in West Bengal 
Districts PCI (in Rs.) % Urban Rank Score Cluster 
Bardhaman 23770 37.5 2.5 
High-
ranking 
districts 
Haora 22566 50.4 2.5 
Darjeeling 23967 31.8 3 
Hooghly 22398 33 4 
Nadia 19981 21 6.5 
Jalpaiguri 19104 17.9 7.5 
N-24 Parganas 16503 54.2 8 
Paschim Medinipur 20914 9.9 8.5 
Purba Medinipur 20914 9.9 9.5 
S-24 Parganas 17760 15.6 10 
Low-
ranking 
districts 
Dakshin Dinajpur 17895 11.6 10.5 
Murshidabad 17486 12.2 11 
Bankura 18236 7.3 13.5 
Maldah 18644 7.2 13.5 
Cooch Bihar 16658 8.8 14.5 
Uttar Dinajpur 14046 11.6 14.5 
Puruliya 16182 9.8 15.5 
Birbhum 16466 8.5 16 
 
Table 14. Respondent categories with identical questionnaires 
Health Administrators  Health Workers  PRI 
 CMOH / ACMOH / 
DYCMOH / BMOH 
  BPHN   GP Pradhan/Upa-Pradhan 
 MO / Supervisor   ANM / Health Assistant   GP member 
 PMU member   Health Supervisor   Panchayat Samity Sabhapati 
     Karmadhaksha member 
     ZP Sabhadhipati 
     ULB member 
     VHSC / non-PRI 
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Table 15. Number of questionnaire items by respondent category, health function and dimension of decentralization 
Respondent category SOP BUD HR SOD M&E PRI  LS Total 
DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC DS CAP ACC 
Health Admin 5 9 2 8 3 3 7 3 3 6 3 3  5       5 26 23 16 
CMOH/BMOH 5 9 2 8 3 3 7 3 3 6 3 3  5       5 26 23 16 
MOH/Superintendent 4 9 2 6 2 2 5 1 2 6 3 2  4       5 21 19 13 
PMU member 4 9 2 5 2 3 3 0 2 5 3 2  4       5 17 18 14 
Health Workers 4 4  6 1 1    2 3 1          12 8 2 
ANM 3 4  5 1 1    2 3 1          10 8 2 
H. Assistant/Supervisor 3 4  5 1 1    2 3 1          10 8 2 
BPHN 2 3  5 1 1    2 3 1          9 7 2 
PRI  6 3  3 2   6  9 4     7   4  3 29 15 
ZP Sabhadhipati  6 3  2 1   4  6 3     4   4  3 22 11 
PS Sabhapati  6 3  2 1   4  6 3     4   4  3 22 11 
GP Pradhan/Upa-
Pradhan 
 6 2  3 2   6  9 4     5   4  3 27 14 
GP member  6 2  2 0   5  8 4     3   4  3 23 11 
ULB Chairman  6 1  2 1   4  6 3     5   4  3 23 9 
Karmadhaksha member  6 3  2 0   3  5 3     3   4  3 20 9 
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Table 16. Respondents sampled — by detailed category of official 
Respondent Category  Jal.  UD  Bard.  Bank.  Birb  PM  Total 
Health Administrators               
CMOH / ACMOH / DYCMOH / BMOH  5  5  6  4  5  5  30 
MOH / Superintendent  4  4  4  1  3  6  22 
PMU member (DPC, DAM/BAM)  3  1  3  2  2  2  13 
Other  0  1  1  1  0    3 
Health Workers               
BPHN  1  1  2  1  1  1  7 
ANM/Health Assistant  4  6  4  4  6  4  28 
Health supervisor/other  2  2  3  2  2  2  13 
PRI Officials               
GP Pradhan/Upa-Pradhan  3  4  3  3  3  2  18 
GP member  2  2  1  2  2  2  11 
P Samati Sabhapati  2  2  2  2  1  2  11 
Karmadhaksha member  2  3  3  3  3  3  17 
ZP Sabhadhipati  1  1  1  0  1  1  5 
ULB member  3  4  4  4  3  3  21 
VHSC/NON-PRI member  3  1  1  1  2  2  10 
Total  35  37  38  30  34  35  209 
 
Table 17. Respondents retained for analysis — by detailed category of official 
Respondent Category  Jal.  UD  Bard.  Bank.  Birb  PM  Total 
Health Administrators               
CMOH / ACMOH / DYCMOH / BMOH  5  5  6  4  5  5  30 
MOH / Superintendent  4  4  4  1  3  6  22 
PMU member (DPC, DAM/BAM)  3  1  3  2  2  2  13 
Other               
Health Workers               
BPHN  1  1  2  1  1  1  7 
ANM/Health Assistant  4  6  4  4  6  4  28 
Health supervisor/other  2  2  2  2  2  2  12 
PRI Officials               
GP Pradhan/Upa-Pradhan  3  4  3  3  3  2  18 
GP member  2  2  1  2  2  2  11 
P Samati Sabhapati  2  2  2  2  1  2  11 
Karmadhaksha member  2  3  3  3  3  3  17 
ZP Sabhadhipati  1  1  1  0  1  1  5 
ULB member  3  4  4  4  3  3  21 
VHSC/NON-PRI member  0  0  0  0  0  0   
Total  32  35  35  28  32  33  195 
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Table 18. Likert scale coding criteria for health administrator survey items 
Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
Strategic and Operational Planning 0 0 0 0 
What is the basis of your assessment of the [current top 
three problems/challenges in public health in your 
district/block]? 
CAP No data-driven methods 0 Any data-driven methods 
What is the normal frequency of assessing district/block 
health priorities?  
CAP DK/none Ad-hoc/No defined 
frequency 
Any 'defined' frequency 
Which is the main planning document/exercise that is 
undertaken for public health in your district/block? 
CAP DK/Unaware 0 Stating any plans 
Do you have a NRHM DHAP/Facility Action Plan/Urban 
Area Health Plan? 
CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
How would you describe the involvement of the following 
persons/officials in developing and formulation of the Plan? 
c. DM/BDO d. MLA/MP 
CAP Not involved/No Role Presence, but no active role Active role, provides 
help/cooperation 
How do you decide on the vulnerable blocks/GPs/areas and 
local health sector priorities for identifying in the 
DHAP/Overall Health Planning?  
CAP Pre-decided/DK 0 Local 
conditions/information only 
While submitting the DHP/BHP for the current financial 
year, was the targets/achievements/drawbacks of previous 
year’s Plan reviewed? 
CAP No/DK 0 
0 
Yes 
Are the DHP/Other Heath Plans used to benchmark 
achievements/targets for health sector program/service 
delivery? 
CAP No/not done in 
practice/DK/etc. 
0 
0 
Yes 
Do you use the performance/outcome indicators and/or 
service statistics in identifying local needs and incorporate 
them into the Annual Plans? Do you use information on 
population health/ health-related information provided by 
the PRIs in identifying vulnerable/thrust areas during the 
planning? 
CAP No/DK  Yes 
How would you describe your involvement in the overall 
health sector planning exercise at the district/block level? 
How would you describe your involvement in the 
development of the NRHM DHAP? 
DS No direct role  Any direct role 
How far can you establish local health priorities in the Plan 
in deviance from the template/Proforma? 
DS Can't establish local 
priorities in deviance from 
template 
 Can establish local priorities 
(in deviance from template) 
Did the higher authorities ask for any revisions/review in DS Asked for revisions  Not asked for revisions/DK 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
the DHAP/BHAP after it was submitted to them last year? 
Are you involved in planning and/or decision-making for 
the following: a. Establishment of new health facilities; b. 
Revision /Realignment/Inclusion /Exclusion of health 
programmes and service delivery; d. Any Special Area 
Programmes 
DS No  Yes 
During the last year (2008-09) have you 
decided/initiated/recommended: a. Construction of new 
health facilities b. Upgradation of existing facilities 
DS No  Yes 
Who (or which body) finally drafted/was responsible for 
developing the NRHM Health Plan/Facility Action 
Plan/Urban Area Health Plan? 
ACC Individual alone 0 Samiti/other sub-committee 
How would you describe the involvement of the following 
persons/officials in developing and formulation of the Plan? 
a. Sabhadhipati (ZP)/Sabhapati (PS) b. Janaswasthya 
Karmadhyaksha 
ACC Not involved/No Role Presence, but no active role Active role, provides 
help/cooperation 
  
Budgeting 
    
Generally, is it possible to fully spend/allocate funds meant 
for health sector in your area within the stipulated time? 
CAP <=75% 76-89% >=90% 
Is the budget decided at the meetings of DHFWS/BHFWS?  CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
Do you have the required financial managers/accountants at 
the DPMU/Block /ULB/ Health facility for 
formulation/processing and monitoring of programme 
budgets and outlays? 
CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
Are your financial managers/accountants technically 
equipped/professionally trained for their jobs? 
No/DK 0 Yes 
Do you think that the accountants of the DPMU/working 
under the DHFWS/BHFWS need further training/career 
development programs/specific trainings on managing 
accounts under the NRHM? 
Yes  No 
On what basis is the funds meant for health programmes 
and improvement of service delivery allocated across the 
health facilities in the district/block? 
DS State guidelines/directions  
only mentioned/DK 
State guidelines / directions  
& local decisions / needs 
Local needs/priorities only 
mentioned 
On what basis expenditure under the following 
funds/expenditure heads is sanctioned by the individual 
DS State 
guidelines/direction/DK 
0 Based on any locally made 
decision-making process 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
health facilities? a. Untied Funds; b. AMG; c. RKS Funds; 
d. User charges; e. NRHM Flexi-pool funds 
(e.g., by DHFWS, RKS) 
What role do you generally play in decisions regarding 
disbursal/expenditure of funds meant for health sector 
development in our District/Block/ULB? 
DS Following guidelines/DK 0 Any other responses 
denoting active involvement 
Are you involved in formulating/preparing any other sub-
district health budget? 
DS No other sub-district budgets Other sub-district budgets 
but not involved in 
formulating them 
Other sub-district budgets 
and involved in formulating 
them 
Have you made any attempt to mobilize additional financial 
resources for health facilities/health sector development 
from other government departments? 
DS No attempts 0 Any attempts 
How would you describe your role in deciding/developing 
the budget? 
DS No involvement 0 Any supervision/'formal' 
role 
Generally, is the annual budget ceiling/maximum amount 
pre-specified by higher authorities, along with the 
respective heads of a/c? 
DS Yes (fixed budget/heads of 
a/c) 
0 No (flexibility) 
After the approval of the budget, are you allowed to make 
requests for additional allotments? 
DS No/DK 0 Yes/attempted, tried 
In your opinion, what is the role of ZP/PS/GP/ULB 
functionaries for deciding and expenditure of funds under 
the Untied Funds and/or AMG meant for health facilities? 
ACC Not involved/No Role/lack 
of interest etc. 
Occasional involvement, not 
much cooperation/'formal' 
role, etc. 
Active role, guidance, joint 
decisions, provides 
help/cooperation etc. 
How would you describe the involvement/participation of 
the following officials in formulating/developing health 
budget and financial planning for health sector? a. 
PRI/ULB President/Chairman; c. Karmadhaksha/Other 
Health Sub Committee members; d. Other people’s 
representatives 
ACC Not involved/No Role/DK Presence, but no active role Active role, provides 
help/cooperation 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
During the last annual budget, were suggestions [for 
specific heads of inclusion/budgetary provisions made by 
ZP members/PS members/members of the Sthayee Samiti 
/Upasamiti RKS] incorporated into the final budget placed 
for approval to the State Dept. of H&FW?  
ACC No involvement or involved 
but suggestions not 
accepted; DK 
Involved and suggestions 
rarely/sometimes accepted 
Involved and suggestions 
mostly/always accepted 
Human Resources CAP No  Yes 
Do you participate in performance evaluation/appraisal of: 
a. Senior MO/Superintendents; b. 
CMOH/ACMOH/BMOH; c. BPHN/Staff Nurse; d. Other 
Grade II/III clerical/non-tech cadre; f. Contractual staff 
CAP 
No  Yes 
How often do you meet with all:  a. DM/ADM/BDO b. PRI 
functionaries (for health sector matters) c. Other people’s 
representatives Health Officials/workers in your 
district/block 
CAP Don't meet Meet but not on set schedule Regularly scheduled 
meetings 
Are there any performance evaluation mechanisms for 
officials at different levels in the department? 
CAP No/DK  Yes 
Does the department maintain records for your and other 
staff’s performance for the last five years? 
 
   
Are you involved in planning and/or decision-making for 
the following: c. Appointment/transfer of physicians and 
health workers; e. Contractual appointment of specialists 
DS No  Yes 
Do you have the power to recruit/contract/suspend: a. 
technical staff (accountants/DEO/MIS/paramedics); b. non-
technical staff (outreach/survey workers/drivers)? 
DS No  Yes 
Do you have the power to propose/recommend/ contracting 
Grade –I/II officials? 
DS No 0 Yes 
During the last year, to modify central schemes and state 
programs to your own needs have you been able to 
reallocate staff (temporarily) to different assignments 
DS No 0 Yes 
Can you use untied funds at the district/block/ULB/Facility 
level for bonus/incentives to health dept. staff (including 
outreach/contractual workers)  
DS No/DK  Yes 
Have you contracted doctors/specialists/others to fill 
vacancies under NRHM 
DS No 0 Yes 
Were [any requests you made for] the following approved: 
a. Changed duty hours of MOs/PHN/ANMs; b. 
Request/recommend creation of new posts; c. Request/ 
DS Requests not approved Requests partially approved Requests approved 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
recommend filling up of vacancies 
Do you generally discuss with PRI/ULB functionaries 
before any appointments/transfer/suspension of medical 
officers and other health workers in your district/block? 
ACC No Sometimes/occasionally Regularly 
Are you involved in planning and/or decision-making for 
the following: c. Appointment/transfer of physicians and 
health workers; e. Contractual appointment of specialists 
DS No  Yes 
Do you have the power to recruit/contract/suspend: a. 
technical staff (accountants/DEO/MIS/paramedics); b. non-
technical staff (outreach/survey workers/drivers)? 
DS No  Yes 
Do you have the power to propose/recommend/ contracting 
Grade –I/II officials? 
DS No 0 Yes 
During the last year, to modify central schemes and state 
programs to your own needs have you been able to 
reallocate staff (temporarily) to different assignments 
DS No 0 Yes 
Can you use untied funds at the district/block/ULB/Facility 
level for bonus/incentives to health dept. staff (including 
outreach/contractual workers)  
DS No/DK  Yes 
Have you contracted doctors/specialists/others to fill 
vacancies under NRHM 
DS No 0 Yes 
Were [any requests you made for] the following approved: 
a. Changed duty hours of MOs/PHN/ANMs; b. 
Request/recommend creation of new posts; c. Request/ 
recommend filling up of vacancies 
DS Requests not approved Requests partially approved Requests approved 
Do you generally discuss with PRI/ULB functionaries 
before any appointments/transfer/suspension of medical 
officers and other health workers in your district/block? 
ACC No Sometimes/occasionally Regularly 
Do the ZP/PS/GP/Municipality in your area monitor and 
certify the attendance of: a. Doctors; b. Paramedics/Other 
health workers? 
ACC No/DK Monitor but can't 
approve/certify 
Monitor and approve/certify 
Do the ZP/PS/GP/Municipality in your area approve Casual 
Leave for: a. Doctors b. Paramedics/Other health workers 
ACC No/DK  Yes 
Service organization/delivery 0 0 0 0 
Have you carried out the following activities in your 
district/block/ULB/health facility during 2008-09: a. 
Maternal death audits/follow-up; b. Prevalence/coverage 
survey under centrally sponsored schemes (TB, Leprosy, 
CAP No  Yes 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
Blindness, and Vector-borne diseases); c. Other Health 
surveys; d. Coverage surveys (Vit. A, pulse polio, UIP); e. 
Family planning; f. Reproductive/Sexual health (RTI/STI); 
g. Adolescent health 
Do you have any standard Grievance Redressal Process in 
the department? 
CAP No/DK  Yes 
How would you describe the Inter-departmental 
convergence in your district/block/ULB regarding 
implementation of health sector programmes? 
CAP Requires much improvement 0 Satisfied/better than before 
Are you involved in procurement of any of the following 
items/heads for the health facilities in your 
district/block/ULB? a. Civil Works; b. Equipments 
(Diagnostic/ OT); c. Equipments (Hardware/Stationery) ; d. 
Transport & Communication; e. Drugs 
(IV/Vaccines/Injectables); f. Others (specify) 
DS No/DK  Yes 
During 2008/9 did you (and your staff) initiate any new 
programs or new ways of providing services that were not 
already in existence or ordered by State Department of 
Health and Family Welfare or Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes? 
DS No  Yes 
If you disagree with any of the state health department 
/central scheme guidelines or have alternative ideas 
regarding service delivery or other operational aspects 
(diverging from the stated mechanisms) is it possible to 
table your views/ideas to higher authorities? 
DS No  Yes 
Have you been able to change/modify: a. OPD/Pay Clinic 
schedules; b. Immunization days; c. Outreach activities 
(ANM/AWW); d. Any other activities (specify) from those 
dictated by central/state norms 
DS No/Haven't tried/Tried but 
not successful 
0 Tried and successful 
During the last year (2008-09) have you 
decided/initiated/recommended: c. Repairs/renovation of 
existing facilities; d. Addition of new services 
(diagnostics/clinics/patient services) 
DS No/DK  Yes 
Have you initiated any scheme/services under the PPP with 
private bodies/SHGs/NGOs? 
DS No  Yes 
How would you describe the role of DHFWS/BHFWS in 
financial planning, programme implementation and 
ACC Expresses problems 0 Feels does a good job 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
improvement of health service delivery in your area? 
Do you regularly attend the meetings of DHFWS/BHFWS?  No Sometimes/irregularly Regularly/Yes etc. 
Do you organize meetings attended by the intended 
beneficiaries of JSY and/or PRI/ULB functionaries? 
ACC No 0 Any meetings organized 
Are the PRI functionaries/members of Upasamiti/Sthayee 
Samiti involved in the above activities? 
ACC No/rarely/DK Sometimes Very involved 
Monitoring & Evaluation 0 0 0 0 
Is there a routine system in your district/block to monitor 
health coverage and outcome indicators (IMR, 
Immunization coverage, DOTS, ANC, Institutional 
delivery)? 
CAP No routine system Routine system but not 
personally reviewed on a 
regular basis 
Routine system that is 
personally reviewed 
How often do you monitor/review the following aspects of  
health service organization at the district/block/ULB/health 
facility: a. Expenditure under budget heads; b. Expenditure 
under non-budget/untied funds/flexi-pool heads; c. Staff 
attendance-MOs/paramedics; d. Drug/Vaccines stocks/Cold 
chain equipments; e. Medical kits for FRUs; f. Civic 
works/Infrastructural requirements 
CAP Not involved/doesn't 
monitor 
Ad hoc/irregular monitoring Regular monitoring 
How often do you monitor/review the following aspects of  
health service delivery/strategic monitoring at the 
district/block/ULB/health facility: Ia. Performance 
indicators (IMR, MMR, Institutional delivery, 
Immunization, ANC etc.); b. Bed turnover rate; c. Bed 
occupancy rate; d. Successful implementation of Referral 
chain; e. OPD/clinic attendance 
CAP Not involved/doesn't 
monitor 
Ad hoc/irregular monitoring Regular monitoring 
How often do the DHFWS/BHFWS monitor/review the 
performance/outcome indicators? 
CAP Not involved/doesn't 
monitor 
Ad hoc/irregular 
monitoring/annually 
Regular monitoring < 
annually 
Do you periodically receive comparative performance 
statistics from other blocks/districts/ULBs/health facilities? 
Are the data helpful in implementing health programs and 
other aspects of service planning and implementation? 
CAP No Not regularly but helpful or 
receive statistics (regularly) 
but not helpful 
Yes/regularly and helpful 
Local support 0 0 0 0 
Has [the ZP Sabhadhipati/PS Sabhapati/ULB 
Chairman/MP/MLA] supported any new activities/health 
schemes in your district/block/ULB/Health facility during 
the last three years? 
ACC Not a priority 0 Supports activities 
Did the MP/MLA in your area devote funds for health ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
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Question (Health Administrators) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
sector during the last three years? 
How would you describe the degree of participation of 
ZP/PS/GP functionaries/ULB members for development 
schemes at the grassroots, especially for health sector? 
ACC DK/Unsatisfied Somewhat satisfied Satisfied 
Do you think that the PRI/ULB functionaries/RKS 
members are oriented/ aware of their roles and 
responsibilities for health sector reforms and development? 
ACC Not at all/no Somewhat aware Fully aware/yes 
Do you generally receive any important suggestions/help 
and cooperation from PRI/ULB functionaries? 
ACC No/rarely Sometimes Often/yes 
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Table 19. Likert scale coding criteria for health worker survey items 
Question (health workers) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
Planning 0 0 0 0 
Are you aware of any health planning exercise at your 
facility/in your GP/ULB/Block? If yes, please name the 
plan (s) you are aware about? 
CAP Not aware Aware but can't cite bona 
fide health plan 
Aware and can cite bona 
fide heath plans 
If you have received any training for the preparation of the 
Health Plan, do you think that the experience helped you in 
preparation of the plan? 
CAP Not involved Involved but did not receive 
formal training or involved 
and received formal training 
that was not useful 
Involved and received 
formal training that was 
useful 
If [receive guidelines/bulletins etc. from higher authorities 
explaining your role in VHSC/BHFWS/RKS meetings], are 
these guidelines helpful in informing you about your 
role/responsibilities in these meetings? 
CAP Didn't receive guidelines Received guidelines but not 
useful 
Received guidelines and 
useful 
If [receive guidelines/bulletins etc. from higher authorities 
explaining your role in monthly GP meetings], are these 
guidelines helpful in informing you about your 
role/responsibilities in these meetings? 
CAP Didn't receive guidelines Received guidelines but not 
useful 
Received guidelines and 
useful 
Do you attend VHSC meetings? DS Doesn't attend Attends but not active 
participant 
Attends and active 
participant 
Do you attend meetings of BHFWS/RKS? DS Doesn't attend Attends but not active 
participant 
Attends and active 
participant 
Are you present in the monthly meetings on health issues at 
the GP? 
DS Isn't (regularly) present Irregularly attends Regularly attends 
Are you invited by the following officials in meetings to 
discuss local health priorities/financial planning etc.: a. 
BMOH/CMOH/Suptdt./Other Health Dept. Officials; b. 
PRI/ULB Functionaries 
DS No  Yes 
Budgeting 0 0 0 0 
Are you aware of any annual budget meant for health sector 
(financial plan) in your facility/GP/Block/ULB? 
CAP No Somewhat Yes 
Did you participate in the annual budgeting exercise at the 
PRI/ULB? 
DS Not involved 0 Involved 
Are you regularly consulted regarding expenditure from 
untied funds/annual maintenance grant/ any other funds 
received from DHFWS or BHFWS received by your health 
facility? 
DS Not aware of any funds or 
aware of some/all funds but 
not consulted 
Aware of any funds and 
sometimes consulted/plays 
passive role 
Aware of any funds and 
regularly consulted/plays 
active role 
Did the BMOH consult you while deciding the: a. Priority DS No  Yes 
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Question (health workers) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
expenditure for the facility; b. Expenditure for any 
outreach/other aspects of health service delivery; c. Under 
the untied funds/Annual Maintenance Grant/any other 
funds for your facility 
Do you maintain the accounts of expenditure and/or bank 
a/c details? 
DS No 0 Yes 
Were you involved in decisions for heads of expenditure? If 
yes, please describe your role in the decision-making 
process. 
DS No Yes - follows guidelines Yes - provides active input 
Are you involved/consulted while deciding the planned 
expenditure under the untied funds received by your 
facility? 
DS No 0 Yes 
Who (or which committee/body) finally approves the 
expenditure for your facility/area under the funds received? 
ACC Anyone other than PRI 
body/member, DK 
0 PRI body/member 
Human Resources     
Do you have in-position: a.  2nd ANM at SC/GPHQSC; b. 
ASHA 
CAP No  Yes 
If [you have an in-position 2nd ANM/ASHA,] were you 
consulted/involved in the selection of a. 2nd ANM at 
SC/GPHQSC b. ASHA 
DS No  Yes 
Service Organization 0 0 0 0 
Have you taken any measures/planned any actions in view 
of the [3 most important public health problems/service 
delivery challenges in your GP/PS/ZP/ULB]? 
CAP Cannot identify any public 
health challenges 
Identifies any public health 
challenges but doesn't name 
any actions taken to redress 
problem(s) 
Can identify any public 
health challenges and names 
any actions taken to redress 
problem(s) 
In your opinion how interested/enthusiastic are the 
following in solving the [3 most important public health 
problems/service delivery challenges in your 
GP/PS/ZP/ULB]: 1. BMOH/CMOH/Suptdt./Health 
officials; 2. PRI/ULB functionaries 
CAP Not interested Somewhat interested Very interested 
Were you involved in the following activities in your health 
facility during 2008-09: a. Health day; b. Maternal death 
audits/follow-up; c. Prevalence/coverage survey under 
centrally sponsored schemes (TB, Leprosy, Blindness, 
Vector-borne diseases); d. Other Health surveys; e. 
Coverage surveys (Vit. A, pulse polio, UIP); f. Family 
planning; g. Reproductive/Sexual health (RTI/STI); h. 
CAP No  Yes 
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Question (health workers) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
Child health (ARI, pneumonia, diarrhea,) 
Do you certify/nominate the JSY beneficiaries to the PRI 
head? Are you involved in disbursement of JSY funds to 
eligible mothers? 
DS No  Yes 
Did you suggest changes/modifications etc. in any of the 
following services to the PRI/ULB functionaries: a. 
OPD/Pay Clinic schedules; b. Immunization days; c. 
Outreach activities (ANM/AWW); d. Any other activities 
(specify) 
DS No  Yes 
Are you required to submit/seek certification for the 
following from the PRI/ULB functionaries: a. 
Outreach/Tour Plan; b. Drug/implements stock at health 
facility; c. Reporting of routine activities; d. Casual/Planned 
leave; e. Clearance/NOC for Salary/Allowances; f. Any 
other activities 
ACC No  Yes 
Local Support     
How would you describe the cooperation you have received 
from PRI/ULB functionaries in discharging your regular 
duties/activities? 
ACC Not involved, not interested, 
etc 
Cooperates when have time, 
to best of ability, etc 
Cooperates regularly and 
usefully 
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Table 20. Likert scale coding criteria for PRI official survey items 
Question (PRI officials) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
PRI decision-making 0 0 0 0 
How often do you have ZP/PS/GP/Council meetings? CAP Annually Between annually and 
monthly 
Monthly 
How often do you have Gram Sansad meetings? CAP Never/annually Not regularly but less than 
annually 
Regularly and less than 
annually 
How often do you have Ward Committee meetings? CAP Never/annually Not regularly but less than 
annually 
Regularly and less than 
annually 
How often do you have Sub-Committee meetings? CAP Never/annually Not regularly but less than 
annually 
Regularly and less than 
annually 
How many members of the ZP/PS/GP/Council regularly 
attend meetings? 
CAP <50% >=50% - < 100% 100% 
How do you decide on the meeting agendas? CAP Head alone decides 0 Members involved 
Do you regularly attend the meetings of PS/GP? CAP Never/rarely Not regularly Regularly 
Do you follow the directions/guidelines [that the political 
party you represent issues/communicates on health 
issues/administration/strategies related to health sector] 
while planning/ management/ monitoring health facilities 
and health issues in your area? 
DS Policy guidelines are issued 
for health sector activities 
and respondent 
usually/always follows 
them 
Policy guidelines are issued 
for health sector activities 
and respondent sometimes 
follows them 
Policy guidelines not issued 
(or respondent doesn't 
know) or guidelines issued 
but respondent doesn't 
follow them 
Strategic & Operational Planning 0 0 0 0 
What is the basis of your assessment of the [top three 
problems/challenges in public health in your 
ZP/PS/GP/ULB]? 
CAP Self-experience only Informal consultation with 
others (in addition to self-
experience or not) 
Based on evidence 
What is the normal frequency of assessing ZP/PS/GP/ULB 
health priorities? 
CAP Never Annually only or not at 
regular frequency 
At regular frequencies 
throughout the year 
Do you have a regular health plan for your 
district/block/GP/ULB? 
CAP DK/No plan NRHM plan stated Any local plan 
How would you describe the involvement of the following 
persons/officials in overall health sector planning exercise? 
CMOH/BMOH; Janaswasthya Karmadhyaksha/VHSC; 
DM/BDO 
CAP No role/not present Ok role/sometimes present Helpful role/usually/always 
present 
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Question (PRI officials) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
How do you decide on the vulnerable blocks/GPs/areas and 
local health sector priorities for identifying in the DHAP?  
CAP Self-experience only Informal consultation with 
others (in addition to self-
experience or not) 
Based on evidence 
What procedures are followed once the DHP/BHP is 
submitted to the higher authorities? 
CAP No feedback 0 Any feedback 
While developing the current year’s health plan for your 
ZP/PS/GP/ULB did you review the targets, achievements 
and drawbacks of the previous year’s Plan? 
CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
Are the DHAP/BHAP or the health plan prepared by PRI 
(i.e., CHCMI) considered as the standard protocol/guideline 
for the future planning of activities/ health service delivery? 
CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
How would you describe your involvement in the overall 
health sector planning exercise at the district/block level? 
ACC No direct role No specific activities 
mentioned in role 
Direct/active role with 
mention of specific 
activities 
Were you involved during the preparation of the NRHM 
District health plan/Block health plan? 
ACC Not aware of plan Aware of plan but not 
involved in formulation 
Aware of plan and involved 
in formulation 
Did the CMOH/BMOH present the District/Block Health 
Plan for review by the ZP/PS; DHFWS/BHFWS; RKS of 
concerned health facilities? 
ACC No 0 Yes 
Budgeting 0 0 0 0 
On an average, since your tenure as the PRI functionary 
what proportion of the PRI/ULB Health Budget outlay was 
utilized? 
CAP <50% 50% - 89% >=90% 
What quantum of funds under the above heads (Q 5a) were 
spent/allotted within the stipulated time (annually)? 
CAP <50% 50% - 89% >=90% 
Have the funds for JSY been audited in the last three years? CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
Do you have specific directives from the PRD/UA dept. 
regarding the : a. Budget provision; b. 
Expenditure/utilization of funds; c. Heads of a/c under 
DS Yes 0 No/DK 
 61 
 
Question (PRI officials) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
which the budget is to be allotted 
Can you make any revisions/re-allocation of PRI/ULB 
Health Budget funds between different heads of a/c? 
DS No/DK 0 Yes 
Are you consulted/your approval required for: a. Disbursal 
of funds under NRHM Flexi-pool; b. Disbursal of funds 
meant for RKS (untied); c. Untied funds for health facilities 
(DH/SDH/SGH/RH/BPHC/PHC/SC); d. Maintenance grant 
for health facilities (DH/SDH/SGH/RH/BPHC/PHC/SC) 
ACC No 0 Yes 
Do you decide about Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY) funds? 
Are you required to seek approval from 
BDO/BMO/anybody else for allotting JSY funds? 
ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
Human Resources 0 0 0 0 
Are you consulted/your approval required for: e. 
Salary/benefits of medical officers; f. Salary benefits of 
other health officials/workers (contractual) 
ACC No 0 Yes 
Do you regularly certify/monitor the attendance of 
MOs/ANMs/Other health workers? 
ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
Do you participate in performance evaluation/appraisal of: 
a. Senior MO/Superintendents; c. BPHN/Staff Nurse; d. 
Other Grade II/III clerical/non-tech cadre; e. Contractual 
staff; f.  Staff at  DPMU/BPMU; g. Any other 
ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
If you receive any complaints against health officials and 
workers (MO/PHN/ANM/other clerical staff etc.), what 
actions do you take? 
ACC No/DK 0 Indicates can take action 
Were you involved in the selection of : a. 2nd ANM; b. 
ASHA; c. Health Supervisor in your GP? 
ACC Don't have in-position 
worker 
Have in-position worker but 
not involved in selection 
Have in-position worker 
and involved in selection 
Do you monitor/approve casual leave of ANM/AWW? ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
Service Organization/delivery 0 0 0 0 
How often do you discuss health issues in the 
ZP/PS/GP/ULB Council? 
CAP Never/rarely No regular frequency Regular frequency 
throughout year 
How often do you discuss health issues in Gram Sansad 
meetings? 
CAP Never/rarely Not regularly Regularly 
 How frequent are the meetings of the VHSCs? CAP Don't have VHSC or have No regular frequency Regular frequency 
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Question (PRI officials) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
VHSC but never/rarely 
meets 
throughout year 
Are the decisions/resolutions of the VHSCs discussed in the 
GP meetings? 
CAP No/no VHSC 0 Yes 
Do you personally review the planned achievements in 
these coverage and outcome indicators [if you have] a 
routine system in your district/block to monitor health 
coverage and outcome indicators (IMR, Immunization 
coverage, DOTS, ANC, Institutional delivery)? 
CAP No routine system/DK Routine system but not 
personally reviewed 
Routine system and 
personally reviewed 
Are you aware about the existence and activities of 
DHFWS/BHFWS in your PRI/ULB area? 
CAP No 0 Yes 
Do you regularly attend the meetings [of the 
DHFWS/BHFWS]? 
CAP Not nominated member or 
nominated member but 
doesn't regularly attend 
0 Nominated member and 
regularly attends 
How important do you feel is the role played by 
DHFWS/BHFWS in expediting the: a. Administrative 
aspects; b. Financial planning/budgeting aspects; c. Service 
organization /Service delivery aspects 
CAP Not important/don't know Somewhat important Important/productive/good 
role 
Have you faced any difficulties/problems in conducting the 
daily activities of the DHFWS/BHFWS? 
CAP No/missing 0 Yes/any problems 
How would you describe the participation of DM/BDO in 
the PRI body/ULB council meetings?  
ACC Never/rarely present Sometimes present Regularly/usually/always 
present 
Have you been able to influence /were you involved in the 
following decisions/planning regarding: a. Location of new 
health facilities; b. Inclusion/exclusion of services in health 
facilities; c. Placement/transfer of health workers and MOs 
in facilities; d. Outreach activities (immunization, 
communicable diseases etc.) for specially targeted 
populations; e. Contracting services of private sector 
ACC No 0 Yes 
Do you monitor/approve outreach /tour programme of 
ANM/AWW of ANM/AWW? 
ACC No/DK 0 Yes 
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Question (PRI officials) Dimen-
sion 
Narrow/low Medium High 
Have [actions/remedial measures been taken when] you 
[have] complained/petitioned the CMOH/BMOH and/or the 
DM/BDO regarding: a. Unavailability of drugs and 
essential supplies in health facilities in your area; b. Non-
functioning of OT/Diagnostic centres/Blood bank/other 
services; c. Cleanliness of wards/health facilities 
ACC Hasn't complained Has complained but no 
action taken 
Has complained and action 
taken 
Local Support 0 0 0 0 
Do you have a separate PRI/ULB budget allotment for 
health & allied sectors? 
CAP No/DK 0 Yes 
Have you taken any initiative to raise funds from other 
sources apart from the Own Funds / the funds provided by 
the ZP/PS/GP/ULB health budget? 
CAP No 0 Yes 
[Can you give an example of...locally generated revenue 
(taxes/surcharges/rent) in your ZP/PS/GP/ULB [that you 
can allocate] for development of health care facilities/health 
service delivery in your area? 
CAP No/DK Yes but respondent can't 
provide example 
Yes and respondent can 
provide example 
Have you tried to get: a. Additional posts (non-NRHM) 
sanctioned (MO/paramedics); b. Filling up of existing 
vacancies for your PRI/ULB area? 
CAP No 0 Yes 
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Table 21.  Associations between dimensions of decentralization within health functions (pooled across 
respondent categories) 
Function
†
  DS/CAP  N  DS/ACC  N  CAP/ACC  N 
Health Administrators/Workers         
SOP  0.41 ** 112  0.11  52  0.11  52 
BUD  0.16 * 112  0.30 ** 98  0.00  98 
HR  0.16  74  0.18  55  0.11  52 
SOD  0.12  112  0.17 * 112  0.23 ** 112 
ALL  0.34 ** 112  0.26 ** 112  0.33 ** 112 
All respondents           
SOP  0.41 ** 112  0.11  52  0.14  135 
BUD  0.11  195  0.19 ** 143  0.06  143 
HR  0.16  74  0.18  55  0.11  52 
SOD  0.12  112  0.17 * 112  0.21 ** 195 
ALL  0.11  195  0.09  195  0.35 ** 195 
**: significant at p < 0.05; *: significant at p < 0.10 
 
Table 22.  Associations within dimensions of decentralization, by respondent category (pooled across 
respondent categories) 
1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function DS  N  CAP  N  ACC  N 
Health Administrators/Workers 
SOP & 
BUD 0.22 ** 112  0.11  112  0.23  52 
HR 0.28 ** 87  -0.01  92  0.31 ** 44 
SOD 0.50 ** 112  0.15  112  -0.02  52 
M&E     0.33 ** 65     
LS         0.10  52 
BUD & 
HR 0.32 ** 87  -0.14  92  0.15  55 
SOD 0.19 ** 112  0.04  112  -0.09  98 
M&E     0.34 ** 65     
LS         0.04  98 
HR & 
SOD 0.21 * 87  0.09  92  0.02  55 
M&E     0.10  52     
LS         0.25 * 55 
SOD & 
M&E     0.22 * 65     
LS         0.16 * 112 
All respondents 
SOP & 
BUD 0.22 ** 112  0.13 * 195  0.13  97 
HR 0.28 ** 87  -0.01  92  0.17 * 127 
SOD 0.50 ** 112  0.17 ** 195  0.04  135 
M&E     0.33 ** 65     
LS     0.30 ** 72  0.10  52 
BUD & 
HR 0.32 ** 87  -0.14  92  0.17 * 100 
SOD 0.19 ** 112  0.04  195  0.09  143 
M&E     0.34 ** 65     
LS     0.22 * 72  0.04  98 
HR & 
SOD 0.21 * 87  0.09  92  0.16 * 138 
M&E     0.10  52     
LS         0.25 * 55 
 65 
 
1
st
 Function
†
 2
nd
 Function DS  N  CAP  N  ACC  N 
SOD & 
M&E     0.22 * 65     
LS     0.18  72  0.16 * 112 
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Figure 6. District-level decision space — by major respondent category 
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Figure 7. District-level capacities — by major respondent category 
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Figure 8. District-level accountability — by major respondent category 
  
  
  
-5.00
0.00
5.00
St
an
d
ar
d
iz
e
d
 S
co
re
 
District 
Health Administrators 
SOP BUD HR SOD ALL
-2.00
0.00
2.00
St
an
d
ar
d
iz
e
d
 S
co
re
 
District 
Health Workers 
BUD SOD ALL
1
2
3
4
5
6
SOP BUD HR
R
an
k 
Function 
Health Workers 
Jalpaiguri Uttar Dinajpur
Bardhaman Bankura
Birbhum Purba Medinipur
-2.00
0.00
2.00
St
an
d
ar
d
iz
e
d
 S
co
re
 
District 
PRI Officials 
SOP BUD HR SOD ALL
1
6
SOP BUD HR SOD ALL
R
an
k 
Function 
PRI members 
Jalpaiguri Uttar Dinajpur
Bardhaman Bankura
Birbhum Purba Medinipur
 69 
 
Figure 9. District-level decision space, capacities and accountability — by major respondent category 
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Table 23.  Summary of district-level levels in decision space, capacities and accountability, by respondent 
category 
Cat.* Decision Space Capacities Accountability 
Birbhum 
HA  Generally below-average and 
variable function-by-function 
levels in comparison to other 
districts 
 Top- or second-rated in all 
functions 
 Top- or second-rated in three of 
four functions; top-rated overall 
HW  Top-rated in all functions  Below-average in two 
functions/above-average in two 
functions; 2
nd
-highest rated 
overall 
 Top-rated in both applicable 
functions / overall 
PRI   Below-average in two 
functions/above-average in two 
functions; 2
nd
-highest rated 
overall 
 Top- or second-rated in three of 
four functions; second-rated 
overall 
Bankura 
HA  Top- or 2nd-highest rated in three 
of four functions (although well 
below-average in SOD); 2
nd
-
highest ranked overall 
 Both above- and below-average 
(particularly low scoring on 
M&E); 2
nd
-highest ranked overall 
 Ranked in top three across all 
functions; 2
nd
-highest ranked 
overall 
HW  Across functions, equally above- 
and below-average; ranked 
around average overall 
 Across functions, equally above- 
and below-average; ranked 
around average overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
2
nd
-lowest ranked overall 
PRI   Lowest-ranked in three of four 
functions and overall 
 Slightly above average for three 
of four functions / overall 
Purba Medinipur 
HA  Highly ranked/above-average 
across all functions and overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
slightly above-average overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
slightly above-average overall 
HW  Above-average across three of 
four functions/overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
2
nd
-lowest ranked overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
slightly above-average overall 
PRI   Highly ranked/above-average 
across all functions; top-ranked 
overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
slightly above-average overall 
Uttar Dinajpur 
HA  Below-average across all 
functions; 2nd-lowest ranked 
overall 
 Below-average across four of five 
functions (exception in M&E); 
2nd-lowest ranked overall 
 Lowest-ranked in three of four 
functions / overall 
HW  Lowest-ranked in three of four 
functions / overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
ranked highest overall 
 Lowest-ranked in one of two 
functions / overall 
PRI   Both above- and below-average; 
ranked below-average overall 
 Lowest-ranked in three of four 
functions / overall 
Jalpaiguri 
HA  Both above- and below-average; 
ranked slightly above-average 
overall 
 Below-average across four of five 
functions (lowest-ranked in 
M&E); lowest-ranked overall 
 Lowest-/2nd-lowest-ranked in 
three of four functions; 2
nd
-
lowest-ranked overall 
HW  Slightly above-average for three 
of four functions; 2
nd
 highest-
ranked overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
lowest-ranked overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
2
nd
-highest-ranked overall 
PRI   Mainly below-average; ranked 
below-average overall 
 Both above- and below-average; 
2
nd
-lowest-ranked overall 
Bardhaman 
HA  Mainly below-average across 
functions; lowest-ranked overall 
 Although slightly above-average 
in most functions; slightly below-
average overall 
 Both below- and above-average 
across functions; slightly below-
average overall 
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Cat.* Decision Space Capacities Accountability 
HW  Below-average across all 
functions; 2
nd
 lowest-ranked 
overall 
 Both below- and above-average 
across functions; slightly below-
average overall 
 Both below- and above-average 
across functions; slightly below-
average overall 
PRI   Both below- and above-average 
across functions; slightly above-
average overall 
 Both below- and above-average 
across functions; top-ranked 
overall 
* HA = Health Administrators; HW = Health Workers; PRI = PRI Officials 
 
Table 24.  Dimensions of decentralization and health sector performance 
Performance 
Indicator 
 DS  CAP  ACC  LS 
 ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N  ρ  N 
Budget Execution  0.70  6  0.08  6  0.55  6  0.06  6 
MCH score  0.78 * 6  0.22  6  0.70  6  0.76 * 6 
Vacancy (all)  0.55  6  0.48  6  0.35  6  0.79 * 6 
 
                                                 
†
 SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization 
†
 SOP = Strategic/Operational Planning; BUD = Budgeting; HR = Human Resources; SOD = Service 
Delivery/Organization; M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation; LS = Local Support; PRI = PRI decision-making 
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7 Appendix II 
Prior to decentralization, the major formal authority for decision making and implementation of 
health activities has long been the responsibility of the state civil service in each state.  Although 
each state has its own state civil service, major positions are occupied by officials who are 
members of the national Indian Administrative Service (IAS).  This special administrative cadre 
is trained to be administrators of the system and not specific technical experts in any of the many 
substantive functions of the government programs.  Under the framework of decentralization, 
local health sector decision-making processes involve a combination of civil service 
administrators, health workers and elected PRI officials.  Since mid-2002, centrally sponsored 
schemes are overseen by the District Health & Family Welfare Samiti (DHFWS) and its block-
level counterpart, the BHFWS in West Bengal..  Except the HIV/AIDS program which still has a 
separate society, all other programs (e.g., RCH2, Immunization, Disease Control (Leprosy, TB, 
Blindness)) are merged, although budgets remain separated.  To further support decentralization, 
Rogi Kalyan Samitis at the District/Block level (for all categories of health facilities from 
Primary Health Centers and above) oversee community management of public hospitals, while 
Village Health and Sanitation Committees are expected to develop village-level health plans. 
 
Strategic and operational planning 
NRHM District Health Action Plans (DHAPs) are developed on an annual basis.  DHAPs are 
prepared by health administrators and presented to the DHFWS, which has the Sabhadhipati 
(President) of the Zilla Parishad as the Chairman of the Governing Body.  Further, the Chairman 
of the Standing Committee on Public Health (Karmadhaksha-JOPSS) and the Chairman of the 
ULBs in the district are members of the committee.  The CMOH functions as the member-
secretary of the DHFWS and is responsible for functioning of the Samiti, including finalizing the 
DHAP, with inputs from the DPMU (but not to the Zilla Panchayat).  The responsibility of 
consolidating district plans lies with the Health and Family Welfare Society at the State level.  
Infrastructure development for the health sector is overseen by District Planning Committees that 
are responsible for overall planning in the district. 
 
Budgeting 
Control of budgets still is held at the State or Central level — local governments do not have any 
choice over shifting heads or from one central scheme to another.  The CMOH prepares the 
budget which is approved by the DHFWS.  Under control of ZPs are the Community Health 
Care Management Initiative, , a separate Public Health Cell, and some budgetary allocations 
made by the state department for Panchayats and rural development meant for public health and 
sanitation activities (includes provision of safe drinking water as well under the Swajal Dhara 
scheme, managed by the public health engineering department). The CMOH sends the budget 
directly to the Health and Family Welfare department at the state level, which then allocates a 
budget according to the district’s needs and their resources. 
 
Local hospital user fees exist for certain services (e.g., ambulance charges, X-Rays, lab tests for 
families above the poverty line) and it appears that wide local choice is exercised by the CMOH 
(or hospital superintendent) over setting of fees.  The ZSS is responsible for collection and 
utilization of user fees and it is usually used for repairs and maintenance, purchase of X-Ray 
rolls, POL for generator/ambulance and emergency drugs.   
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There are also a variety of facility-level untied grants.  First, under NRHM provisions an annual 
untied grant of Rs. 10,000 has been sanctioned for Sub-Centers with a view to provide financial 
help for low-cost essential services/tasks. The amount is to be deposited in a bank account jointly 
operated by the ANM, GP Pradhan, and the Executive Assistant of the GP.  The expenditure 
incurred under the untied funds is to be endorsed and approved by the GP.  For emergency 
expenses, post-facto approval is required, to be formally approved in the following GP meeting.  
Second, PHCs receive an annual untied grant of Rs. 25,000.  Approved expenditures include 
minor renovations, purchase of equipment and emergency medicines, and other various 
operating expenses.  Finally, RKSs have access to annual facility maintenance grants for use in 
PHCs (of Rs. 50,000) and in BPHCs (of Rs. 100,000).  The State maintains a list of approved 
expenditures. 
 
There is an Emergency Drug Fund that is 20% of the total drug budget for a district.  The 80% is 
retained at the state level for bulk purchases.  The CMOH has authority to make local purchase 
of drugs with his/her Emergency fund.  The drugs should be on the Master List (EDL) and 
should be generic drugs.    
 
PRIs have some funds that they can assign to health for equipment purchases mainly.  These 
funds come from the State Finance Commission and are said to be assigned in equal portions to 
each member of the PRI for use in their wards.  ZPs also have separate allocations meant for 
public health, sanitation and drinking water provision from the State, executed by the JOPSS and 
the District Public Health Cell.  Additionally, GPs and ULBs can, if decided unanimously by the 
councils and, at times, on the basis of guidelines from respective departments, allocate locally 
generated revenue (from user charges, taxes etc.) as supplements to health department funds or, 
mostly in IEC and health promotion activities. 
 
 
Human Resources 
Most HR decisions are made by the DHFWS or RKSs with endorsement by the DM.  The 
CMOH cannot hire or fire permanent employees, he can at most recommend disciplinary actions. 
The CMOH has some choice of transfer within the district, contract hiring, and suspension for all 
staff below physicians.  The CMOH can recommend transfers or request the State Health & 
Family Welfare department for new posting and for filling of vacancies, but the final decision 
rests with the State. 
 
ANMs need to be matriculate and have passed the 18-month ANM course from designated 
institutes.  They are appointed by the directorate of health services, through the district 
employment exchange. 
 
PRIs have been given the authority to approve casual leave of the ANM and Medical Officers 
including the CMOH.  Frontline health workers such as  ANMs, health assistants and ASHA 
workers requires a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) issued by the GP Prodhan in order to receive 
their monthly salary.  The Pradhan, in the 4
th
 Saturday meeting, reviews the attendance register.  
 
Service Organization and Delivery 
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The central and state requirements control most of the service delivery choices for programs and 
priorities. However, based on DHFWS/BHFWS decisions, local health officials can introduce 
new/innovative programs (e.g., contracting services of specialists, health camps etc.) or minor 
changes in any existing services (e.g., clinic hours, outreach programs, need-assessment surveys, 
etc.) based on local needs and requirements. 
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8 Appendix III 
Position/Designation/
Committee 
Major functions 
District Magistrate 
(DM) / Additional 
District Magistrate 
(ADM) / Block 
Development Officer 
(BDO) 
 DMs and ADMs are generally civil service officials from the IAS or senior officers from the state civil service (executive) cadre.  
BDOs are state civil service officials. The DM/BDO acts as the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad /Panchayat Samiti and 
advises the Sabhadhipati/Sabhapati.  
 District Magistrates are entrusted with a variety of responsibilities (e.g., overseeing law and order; revenue collection/taxation; and 
planning), including some health sector-related functions.  ADMs (mostly the ADMs in charge of Development and/or Zilla 
Parishads) generally look into specialized functions and have sectoral responsibilities. They assist the DM in deciding about 
development plans and budgets (including health sector) and human resource recruitment, transfers, contracts, and performance 
reviews. BDOs have similar powers corresponding to the DM at the block level. 
 DMs and/or ADMs act in close consultation with the CMOH on matters related to health; at times the DM may request 
revisions/modifications or provide suggestions as required.  
Chief Medical Officer 
for Health (CMOH) / 
Block Medical Officer 
for Health (BMOH) 
 CMOH/BMOH is involved in general planning, supervision, and coordinating implementation and final deciding authority of all 
programs at the district/block level.    
 He is the member-secretary of the District/Block Health & Family Welfare Samiti (DHFWS/BHFWS), a special invitee in the 
meetings of the Janaswathya-O-Paribesh Sthayee Samiti (Standing Committee on Public Health & Environment, including 
Sanitation) of the Zilla Parishad (ZP)/Panchayat Samiti 
 CMOH advises the ZP president (Sabhadhipati), and the district administration on policy matters and daily activities related to health 
service delivery. The BMOH correspondingly advises the Sabhapati of Panchayat Samiti and supervises the functioning of 
RH/BPHC/PHCs and Sub-Centres and the activities of frontline health workers (ANM/Health Assistants/ASHA workers) 
 The CMOH also supervises the functioning of the NRHM District Program Management Unit (DPMU) and coordinates between the 
activities of different health programs and interventions.   
 The CMOH reports to the Director of Health Services (DHS) at the state secretariat and is in overall charge of the health system 
administration at the district level. The BMOH reports to the CMOH. 
Assistant Chief 
Medical Officer for 
Health (ACMOH) / 
Deputy Chief Medical 
Officer for Health  
(DyCMOH) 
 CMOHs are supported by a variety of cadres with similar responsibilities, including ACMOHs and DYCMOHs 
 The ACMOH is generally in charge of similar functions (like the CMOH) at the sub-division level and de facto the highest health 
official in urban areas. 
 DyCMOHs, who generally number three or four in a district, assist the CMOH in specific areas such as implementation of RCH 
services, HMIS, national disease programs (e.g., TB, leprosy and blindness) and personnel and general administration. 
District Programme 
Management Unit 
(DPMU) / Block 
Programme 
Management Unit 
(BPMU)  
 PMUs are specially constituted support units under the NRHM and all the appointees are purely contractual. DPMU comprises of a 
District Programme Coordinator, Accounts Manager, Data Entry Operator and Statistical Manager. BPMU does not have a statistical 
manager. 
 The DPMU/BPMU assists the CMOH/BMOH in providing an up-to-date summary of health sector programs and health service 
statistics, helps in preparing the action plans/annual budget, and maintain accounts of the funds received under NRHM and other 
nationally sponsored programs (such as RCH-II). 
Superintendent /  MOs are doctors at the Primary Health Centre- (PHC), Block Primary Health Centres (BPHC), Rural Hospitals (RH), Sub-
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Position/Designation/
Committee 
Major functions 
Medical Officer (MO) Divisional/State General Hospitals (SDH/SGH) and District Hospitals (DH). They are usually fresh MBBS appointees in PHCs, and 
on seniority-basis are promoted to upper-level health facilities.  MOs in block PHCs (BPHCs), rural hospitals, SD/SG hospitals and 
medical colleges are senior physicians serving the public sector. 
 Superintendents are in charge of administration and day-to-day functioning of health facilities from the BPHC upwards.  A senior 
MO is in charge at PHCs. Both these cadres of health officials are primarily concerned with curative service provisions, and aid in 
implementation of national health program; they are not primarily involved in public health activities. MOs from PHCs extend 
necessary supervision and guidance to ANMs and designated sub-centres.   
 Based on their place of posting, these officials participate in the activities of the RKSs, and advise/consult with and report to the 
BMOH/ACMOH/CMOH regarding general service delivery, facility-level planning and budget/financial expenditures specific to the 
health facility. 
Block Public Health 
Nurse (BPHN) 
 BPHNs are public health workers, who assist the BMOH in planning, supervision, implementation and feedback/reporting of 
national public health programs 
Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife  (ANM) / 
Health Assistants / 
Health Supervisors 
 (ANMs) are front-line health workers at the village/sub-centre level.  ANMs hold a minimum level of education of 10th pass and 
receive one and one-half years of specialized training. Senior ANMs with at least five years of experience can receive additional 
training to supervise and provide technical assistance to ANMs. Health Supervisors are senior ANMs operating from the Gram 
Panchayat Head Quarter Sub-Centre (GPHQSC). 2
nd
 ANMs are newly constituted cadre of health workers under the NRHM and 
have similar responsibilities of ANMs.  
 ANMs are supposed to have received specific training in planning and management of funds of the sub centre (a responsibility they 
share with the Gram Panchayat Pradhan). On paper, they should be involved in developing the Village Health Plans, oversee the 
activities of Village Health & Sanitation Committees, wherever existing and provide a monthly log of activities and performance 
indicators to the BMOH. 
Sabhadhipati (Zilla 
Parishad ) /Sabhapati 
(Panchayat Samit) / 
Karmadhakshyas 
 Both the Sabhadhipati and Sabhapati have executive role and powers in relations with the health sector. 
 They are the members of governing body of the DHFWS/BHFWS and ratify decisions taken in the Samiti meetings. They are also 
members of the Rogi Kalyan Samities (explained latter) and jointly decide on the expenditure under untied funds/maintenance grants 
received by the respective facilities. 
 Together with civil service administrators (DM, BDOs) and health officials (CMOH/BMOH), they also participate in consultative 
processes of local need assessment, identifying local vulnerabilities and deciding on health service delivery improvement measures.   
 They chair the meetings of the PRI standing committee on public health which is responsible for deciding on public health and 
sanitation initiatives and programmes, and oversee the functioning of health facilities and service delivery. 
Chairman, 
Municipality 
 Have similar roles and responsibilities as members of RKS/DHFWS/BHFWS like the PRI presidents, but with limited jurisdiction 
only within the urban area 
 The ULB chairman, together with the member-in-council in charge of public health (and other sub-committee members)  in the 
ULB, decides on functioning of urban health centres and clinics, provision of drinking water and sanitation and expenditure under 
the funds received directly by the ULB from the Urban Affairs department and/or other donors/agencies. 
 In urban settings, the sub-committee on public health/health cell are headed by a chairman-in-council, with the local ACMOH 
(often) as an invited member and comprises of elected members to the ULB, municipal sanitary inspector and health officers/medical 
officers as invitees. 
Gram Panchayat  Gram Panchayats (GPs) are headed by GP Pradhan and attended by other GP members.  All GP members are supposed to receive 
 77 
 
Position/Designation/
Committee 
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Prodhan / Upo-
Prodhan / Sanchalak 
short term training on PRI roles and responsibilities.   
 The GP Pradhan is a member of the BHFWS and the RKS of the local PHC. Additionally, GP members are involved in creating 
awareness among the local people about the main aspects of public health and helping in different aspects of curative and preventive 
care, including family planning and child nutrition under the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and midday meal 
scheme, overseeing and helping in implementing the schemes of maternal & child health care (RCH) and disease control (TB, 
malaria, etc.), maintaining the birth-death register and assist/advise/monitor daily activities and functions of ANM and other health 
workers in local health facilities. 
Janaswasthya-o-
Paribesh Sthayee 
Samiti (JOPSS ) /Upo-
Samiti 
 The standing committee/sub-committee is comprised of elected members to the PRI body, headed by a Karmadhakshya/Sanchalak 
(Working president/Coordinator). It is the topmost decision-making, planning and coordinating body within a PRI on issues related 
to provision of drinking water and improved sanitation, health service delivery, preventive health programmes (MCH) etc. 
 The standing committee/sub-committee decides on the PRI budget in public health and advises the PRI president on issues and 
policy decisions regarding health sector (construction of new health facilities, repair/renovation  of existing ones for e.g.) 
District/Block Health 
& Family Welfare 
Samiti (D/BHFWS) 
 Societies constituted under the State Health Society in 2005, under the NRHM involving health officials, civil administrators, PRI 
members, officers from related line departments and representatives of civil society/non-governmental organizations 
 Major decision-making body on all aspects related to the health sector including planning, budgeting, need assessment, monitoring 
and evaluation and programme implementation. 
 Provides a platform for exchange of opinion among different stakeholders and he government officials and decide on local health 
priorities and suggest remedial measures. 
Rogi Kalyan Samitis 
(RKS) 
 RKSs are constituted involving different stakeholders (largely similar to the constitution of the DHFWS) for the primary function of 
administration, improving service delivery, monitoring activities of health department staff, incorporate users demands and 
grievances etc. 
 A major responsibility of the RKS is to plan and execute expenditure under the untied funds and maintenance grants received 
directly by the facility under the NRHM, guided by a specified list of permissible expenses. 
 
